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Abstract
Among the myriad ways that the interests of underprivileged persons and groups can be pro-
tected and promoted, and other causes of public interest can be served, is through the participation
by amicus curiae in litigation adjudicating relevant issues. Amici must “identify every person or
entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made a monetary contribu-
tion to the preparation or submission of the brief.” An amicus who has been adversely affected
as an individual by enforcement of a law that a corporate litigant is contesting may be able to
poignantly present the law’s ramifications through personal perspective and in eidetic detail. The
benefits of such participation also may be apparent in public interest litigation, where an indi-
gent or poorly-resourced litigant lacks adequate representation and amicus support advocates for
a more promising disposition. Although the submission of briefs by amici can promote a greater
understanding by the court of the potential impact and policy implications of its ruling, a number
of issues have been raised about the advisability and utility of amicus participation. Pro bono
representation of public interest amici is especially important in light of the increasingly common
practice of filing amicus briefs, support for which typically is easier to marshal by the government
and the private sector.
THE UTILITY OF PRO BONO
REPRESENTATION OF U.S.-BASED AMICUS
CURIAE IN NON-U.S. AND MULTI-NATIONAL




Among the myriad ways that the interests of underprivi-
leged persons and groups can be protected and promoted, and
other causes of public interest can be served, is through the par-
ticipation by amicus curiae in litigation adjudicating relevant is-
sues. Amicus participation has a long and venerable tradition
with civil rights and other social justice causes in the United
States. Used in a judicious fashion with adequate safeguards, pro
bono representation of amici can serve such interests in non-U.S.
and multi-national tribunals.
Although some have questioned whether the amicus curiae
practice has lost sight of its role as a "friend of the court," and
become instead a "friend of the party," amicus briefs have been
filed with increasing frequency. It appears that courts give con-
sideration to arguments advanced by amici, who assist the court
by presenting alternative or supplementary arguments or empiri-
cal factual information, and thus play an important role in judi-
cial analysis.
In the international arena, amicus submissions can play a val-
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uable role by presenting diverse experiences and perspectives to
a court that may not previously have addressed the issue with
which the court is confronted. Pro bono representation of under-
privileged amici is critical as a means of fostering their interests,
ensuring they are not over-shadowed by better-resourced amici,
and providing assistance where other support has not adequately
matured. Disclosures such as the nature of the amici's interests
and sources of funding help promote credibility and deter mis-
placed inferences of bias. Because amici curiae, like other liti-
gants, must avoid knowing misstatements of law or fact, efforts to
influence the court's determination through the amici device is
directed through a prism of analytical thought or empirical
foundation that is visible to the litigants and the public at large.
Advocacy through the amicus device thereby helps further the
administration of justice by promoting consideration of diverse
viewpoints.
I. THE ORIGINS OF AMICUS CURIAE SUBMISSIONS
The Latin phrase "amicus curiad' means "friend of the
court." The term refers to "[a] procedure whereby an appellate
court may be informed by persons not parties to a legal action,
who are nonetheless particularly informed or interested in the
outcome (or at least in the law being declared)."'
The definition comports with the historical roots of the
practice of amicus filings. The submission of amicus briefs in
some form "may be more than a thousand years old, beginning
in ancient Rome. Amici provided information, at the court's dis-
cretion, in areas of law in which the courts had no expertise or
information."2 From this practice, or perhaps in a separately
evolving practice,' the English common law developed the prac-
tice of amicus participation as a means of "helping judges avoid
errors and in maintaining judicial honor and integrity by acting
as 'the judiciary's impartial friend,' providing information be-
1. Arthur Allen Leff, The LeffDictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2012
(1983).
2. Sylvia H. Walbolt & Joseph H. Lang, Jr., Amicus Briefs: Friend or Foe of Florida
Courts ?, 32 STETSON L. REv. 269, 270 (2003); see also Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court?
The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First Amendment Litigation, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1605, 1607 & n.10 (1999).
3. See, e.g.,Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of 'Friends of the Court," 61 N.Y. ST. BARJ.,
Apr., at 12-13 (1989).
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yond the court's expertise."4
For example, in 1686, Sir George Treby, a member of Par-
liament, appeared as amicus by leave of the court to advise the
tribunal about the intended meaning of a law the court was
charged with interpreting.5 "The function of the amicus curiae at
common law was a form of oral 'shepardizing,' the bringing up
of cases not known to the judge. In this role, the amicus submis-
sion originally was intended to provide a court with impartial
legal information that was beyond its notice or expertise, which
is where the name amicus curiae, or 'friend of the court' is de-
rived."6 Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of New York's highest court
characterized the amicus in this type of situation as "a sort of leg-
islative hotline."7 There was no requirement that the amicus be a
lawyer, "and the general attitude of the courts was to welcome
such aid, since 'it is for the honor of a court of justice to avoid
error.' "
One commentator observed that "[n] o longer a mere friend
of the court, the amicus has become a lobbyist, an advocate, and,
most recently, the vindicator of the politically powerless."9 The
process has been envisaged less as one imparting unbiased schol-
arly guidance to the Court and more as one comprising dueling
amici. This phenomenon has not been without critics, one of
whom opined that "[n] otwithstanding thejudiciary's good inten-
tions, the removal of restrictions on third party involvement has
metamorphosed the amicus curiae doctrine into an adversarial
weapon."l°
Some interest groups have been established for the purpose
of participating as amici in appellate cases. Such entities some-
times are described as "acknowledged adversaries" or "litigating
4. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 2, at 270.
5. See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694,
695 (1963).
6. Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First Amend-
ment Litigation, 26 FORD-AM URB. L.J. 1605, 1607 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
7. Kaye, supra note 3, at 10.
8. Lucas, supra note 6, at 1607 & n.16 (quoting Protector v. Geering, 145 Eng. Rep.
394 (Ex. 1656)).
9. Michael K Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After
the Friends Leave?, 41 Am. U. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1992).
10. MichaelJ. Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend Or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLKJ. TRIAL & Ap'. ADvoc. 1, 6 (2000).
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amic[i]."" Others engage in both direct representation and par-
ticipate as amici. For example, the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU") appears on behalf of litigants, and, with con-
spicuous frequency, as amicus. From 1969 through 1981, for in-
stance, the ACLU participated in forty-four percent of all crimi-
nal cases in which an amicus brief was filed. 12 The ACLU has
participated in such landmark rulings as Mapp v. Ohio, 3 Gideon
v. Wainwright,"4 Escobedo v. Illinois, 5 and Miranda v. Arizona.1 6
The ACLU is among civil rights groups that regularly use the
amicus device to protect and advance civil rights.
Professional organizations, such as bar associations and
medical associations, also participate in litigation as amici, as do
corporations, unions, and banks. 7 Amici cross a range of politi-
cal spectra; one commentator surmised that there may be "al-
most as many 'conservative' public interest groups as liberal
ones."'
18
Groups with commercially-based interests have been created
in order to advance the interests of their constituents. One such
example is the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., 9 which
is a non-profit association with more than a hundred members
representing U.S. and international product manufacturers. z0
Another frequent amicus party is the government, at both
the federal and State levels. This practice is believed to have
originated nearly two centuries ago in Green v. Biddle."' In that
case, Henry Clay appeared on behalf of the State of Kentucky as
11. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 2, at 271 (citing Krislov, supra note 5, at 704).
12. See Gregg Ivers & Karen O'Connor, Friends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae Participa-
tion and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969-1982, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 161, 168 (1987).
13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17. See generally Bruce J. Ennis, Symposium on Supreme Court Advocacy: Effective Ami-
cus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REv. 603 (1984).
18. Id. at 604 & n.3.
19. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability -
The American Law Institute's Process of Democracy and Deliberation, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 743,
755 n.57 (1998).
20. See, e.g., Brief of the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellants, In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos.
00-8003, 02-8004, 02-8005 (7th Cir. 2002).
21. 21 U.S. 1 (1823).
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amicus. The Office of the Solicitor General currently is among
the most frequent amicus litigants in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although the amicus frequently tends to support one party's
position in opposition to that asserted by the other party, amici
also may participate to protect third party interests exclusively.
In one early case, the court allowed the amicus to argue that the
suit between the parties was collusive and would impact the mari-
tal status of the amicus.22 The amicus thereby sought to protect
both the interests of the amicus and the interests of the court.
Subsequent cases, notably involving amici that represent not-for-
profit groups or underprivileged persons, position amici as advo-
cates for persons not otherwise officially before the court or who
might be precluded from appearance because of standing pre-
requisites.
II. PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING AMICUS SUBMISSIONS
A. Prerequisites to Filing
Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court specifically con-
templates the submission of amicus briefs.2 ' Generally, in order
to file an amicus brief, the amicus is required to secure the par-
ties' consent or the Court's leave. Exceptions to consent and
leave requirements in the Supreme Court apply to briefs submit-
ted by the U.S. government and by States, including by State At-
torneys General and authorized local law enforcement officers.2 4
Motions for leave to file are granted routinely, mitigating an
inclination by parties' counsel to refuse consent. Yet courts oc-
casionally deny such motions. The New York Court of Appeals
recently refused to allow Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver to ap-
pear as amicus25 in a bond bailout case, Local Gov't Assistance Corp.
v. Sales Tax Receivable Corp.2 6 The court, which allowed the Bank
of New York to proceed as amicus as Successor Trustee under the
22. See Coxe v. Phillips, 95 Eng. Rep. 152 (KB. 1736).
23. See Sup. CT. R. 37. Other rules apply to such filings, such as Rule 29, governing
filing and service; Rule 30, addressing computation of time; and Rule 33, specifying
format, page limits, and the colors of covers. See Sup. CT. R. 29, 30, 33.
24. See Sup. CT. R. 37.4.
25. See Local Gov't Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Receivable Corp., Motion No. 334,
2004 N.Y. LEXIS 949 (N.Y. May 4, 2004).
26. See Local Gov't Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Receivable Corp., 813 N.E.2d 587
(N.Y. 2004).
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Local Assistance Corporation Bond Resolutions2" and the New
York State Conference to proceed as amicus,28 did not explain its
decision regarding Silver's motion.29 Previously, the same court
declined to bestow amicus status on legislators in cases determin-
ing the constitutionality of legislation.3"
Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, addressed the tendency of judges to
grant motions for leave to file amicus curiae briefs without ade-
quate deliberation. 1 He noted that the vast majority of amicus
briefs are filed by "allies of litigants" who repeat the arguments
made in the parties' briefs, which merely serve to extend the
length of each litigant's brief.E3 2 "Such amicus briefs should not
be allowed. They are an abuse," he concluded. "The term 'ami-
cus curiae' means friend of the court, not 'friend of a party.' 33
Judge Posner posited three instances in which submissions gen-
erally should be permissible: when a party is not represented
competently or is not represented at all, when the amicus has an
interest in some other case that may be affected by the decision
in the instant case, and when the amicus has "unique informa-
tion or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that
the lawyers for the parties are able to provide."34
B. Disclosure Requirements
Interests are rendered more transparent and possible biases
of amici are probed in three general ways through disclosure re-
quirements for submissions to the U.S. Supreme Court. First,
amici are required to submit a statement of interest in their
briefs, which helps inform the Court about the interest groups
or other entities and persons they represent. 5 Second, Supreme
27. See Local Gov't Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Receivable Corp., Motion No. 293,
2004 N.Y. LEXIS 595 (N.Y. Apr. 1, 2004).
28. See Local Gov't Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Receivable Corp., Motion No. 335,
2004 N.Y. LEXIS 952 (N.Y. May 4, 2004).
29. See Local Gov't Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Receivable Corp., Motion No. 334,
2004 N.Y. LEXIS 949 (N.Y. May 4, 2004).
30. See Court Denies Silver Amicus Status in Bond Bailout Case, N.Y.L.J., May 5, 2004, at
1.
31. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir.
1997).
32. See id. at 1063.
33. Id. (citations omitted).
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. SuP. CT. R. 37.2(b), 37.3(b).
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Court Rules require amici, other than governmental amici, to dis-
close "whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or
in part. '3 6 Third, amici must "identify every person or entity,
other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of the brief. 37
As one commentator observed, "if amici are less than per-
fectly candid with the appellate tribunal as to their true motiva-
tion behind filing the brief, their objectivity - and thus their
ability to represent the important interests of non-parties in liti-
gation - becomes questionable. Such interested amici may,
therefore, actually subvert the judicial system's goal of serving
the public interest." 8 State court procedural rules vary among
states, leading another commentator to suggest that Florida
courts adopt the Supreme Court rule to promote "greater disclo-
sures regarding both who funded and who wrote the amicus
brief. 13
Mindful of the "creative use" of amicus briefs by interested
parties,4" Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure re-
quires amici to disclose the person or entity on whose behalf the
brief is tendered and the source of any fee paid or to be paid for
preparing the brief.4 The Rule has been criticized for failing to
require disclosure of the author of the filing, "leaving open the
possibility for a party's counsel to create the brief and have it
signed by an outside attorney[, a] maneuver [that] effectively ex-
tends the page limits imposed on the parties. '4 2 In addition,
concern has been expressed that the party's counsel may review
and modify the amicus filing without apprising the court that it
has done so, may handle similar cases that will be impacted by
the ruling without so noting, or may be funded indirectly with-
out disclosure.43
36. Sup. CT. R. 37.6
37. Id.
38. Nancy Bage Sorenson, The Ethical Implications of Amicus Briefs: A Proposal for
Reforming Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 30 ST. MARY'S LJ. 1219, 1222
(1999).
39. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 2, at 308.
40. Sorenson, supra note 38, at 1222.
41. See TEX. R. App. P. 11.
42. Sorenson, supra note 38, at 1222-23.
43. See id. at 1223.
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C. Ethical Considerations
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct require a lawyer to "act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client" and contemplate "tak[ing]
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a
client's cause or endeavor."44 The Rules also provide that a law-
yer should zealously advocate on his client's behalf.4 5 It is the
client who determines the objectives of litigation.46
These principles have two basic implications in the context
of amicus filings. First, the litigant's counsel may deem it a dis-
service to his client to urge the court to adopt a broader ruling,
lest doing so dilute the impact of the client's primary objective.4 7
The amicus party can fill such a void or complement the range of
perspectives presented to the court.
Second, like the lawyer who represents a party, the lawyer
who represents the amicus party works, within legal bounds, to
advance his client's interests. Thus the amicus party's arguments
focus on the application of the pertinent law to the amicus.
III. THE FREQUENCY AND APPARENT EFFICACY OF
AMICUS FILINGS
The use of amicus briefing is increasing. In the 1965 to 1966
term of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, thirty-five percent
of cases decided by opinion included amicus filings; in the 1980
to 1981 term, seventy-one percent of such cases had amicus par-
ticipation; by the 1998 to 1999 term, ninety-five percent had at
least one amicus filing.48 Increasingly, too, cases have amicus fil-
ings by more than one amicus or group of amici.
Some have questioned the utility of amicus participation.
Criticism has been targeted primarily on the ground that the
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (1983).
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1; see also MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980).
46. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) & cmt. 1. The clear exception
to this rule is when a client wants the lawyer to perpetuate or aid in the commission of a
crime or fraud. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 1.16 cmt. 2; MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(b) (1980).
47. See, e.g., infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text.
48. See Alexander Wohl, F7iends with Agendas, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1996, at 46; see also
Ennis, supra note 17, at 603 (reviewing 90 cases argued before the Supreme Court in
the 1998-99 term).
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amicus party appears as a partisan advocate.4" The efficacy of the
role of the amicus curiae party has been characterized as "lim-
ited," at least in part on the ground that his service as a friend to
the court has been eclipsed by a loss of objectivity.5"
Although precise measurements of the impact of amicus
submissions on the judiciary are not feasible, Professors Joseph
D. Kearney of Marquette University and Thomas W. Merrill of
Northwestern University worked to examine the empirical im-
pact of amicus curiae briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court.5" Kearney
and Merrill concluded definitively that the level of participation
has increased dramatically over the second half of the last cen-
tury; notwithstanding a decline in the number of cases that the
Court disposed of on the merits during the same period, the
number of amicus filings increased by more than 800 percent.52
The academicians also noted that amicus briefs supporting re-
spondents enjoyed greater success rates than those supporting
petitioners.5" While amicus briefs cited by the Court appeared
no more likely to be associated with the winning side than those
not cited by the Court, amicus briefs submitted by "more exper-
ienced" lawyers may have been more successful than those filed
by "less experienced" ones.54
Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court Counsel of the National As-
sociation of Attorney Generals, opined that "[a] micus briefs un-
questionably have an effect on Supreme Court opinions."55
Among several illustrations he cited as to the utility of amicus
filings for various purposes, he recounted that during oral argu-
ment in Grutter v. Bollinger,56 a case concerning affirmative action
issues, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg questioned petitioner's
counsel about an amicus brief submitted on behalf of certain re-
tired military officers; several minutes of oral argument were de-
49. See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
50. See Harris, supra note 10, at 7.
51. SeeJoseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743 (2000).
52. See id. at 749.
53. See generally id.
54. See id. at 749.
55. Dan Schweitzer, Development and Practice Note: Fundamentals of Preparing a United
States Supreme Court Amicus Brief 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 523, 542 (2003).
56. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (addressing the race-based admissions policy of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School).
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voted to issues addressed in the brief.5 7 When the Court issued
its decision, the amicus' arguments comprised a paragraph of the
opinion, and seven other amicus submissions were cited as well.5"
The Court specifically noted that the respondent law school's
"claim of a compelling interest [was] further bolstered by its
amici, who point[ed] to the educational benefits that flow from
student body diversity."" Among the Court's citations was an
amicus brief submitted by the American Educational Research
Association that contended that "numerous studies show that
student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better
prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and soci-
ety, and better prepares them as professionals."60 Schweitzer re-
garded this level of attention to amicus briefs to be relatively ab-
errational, but noted that "virtually all amicus briefs are read by
the Justices and/or their clerks . "...61
In some instances, counsel for amici may even be permitted
to present oral argument. In Gideon v. Wainwright,6 2 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider "the prob-
lem of a defendant's federal constitutional right to counsel in a
state court[, which had] been a continuing source of controversy
and litigation in both state and federal courts."63 The Court al-
lowed, by special leave, the ACLU and the State of Alabama to
argue the issue as amicus curiae.6 4
Kathryn Kolbert coordinated the submission of amici briefs
on behalf of the ACLU and the Planned Parenthood Federation
in Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs.,6" a case considering abortion
rights that generated dozens of amicus briefs. Kolbert noted that
"several briefs made overlapping arguments which diluted the
57. See Schweitzer, supra note 55, at 523-24 nn.2-3 (citing U.S. Sup. Ct. Official
Transcr. at 7-13, 19-23, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), No. 02-241 (argued
Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2004)
(referring to the Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amicus Curiae)).
58. See Grntter, 539 U.S. at 330.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. Schweitzer, supra note 55, at 524.
62. 370 U.S. 335 (1963)
63. Id. at 338.
64. See id.; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (allowing counsel for amicus
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") to be heard during oral argument).
65. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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overall impact of the collection .... 66 She opined that, none-
theless, "there is little doubt that the pro-choice amici effort both
influenced the Court and significantly contributed to the public
debate on the abortion question. '"67
IV. PURPOSE OFAMICUS SUBMISSIONS
Attorney Bruce Ennis credited amicus briefs with helping to
shape court decisions by offering an analytical approach or fur-
nishing factual information the parties did not discuss.68 Ennis
states, "A good idea is a good idea, whether it is contained in an
amicus brief or in the brief of a party."69 ChiefJudge Judith Kaye
of New York opined that
[a]mici have unquestionably been important in Supreme
Court decisionmaking. Their voices may affect the outcome
of petitions for certiorari, and in pending cases they have
served to inform the Court of likely repercussions of a deci-
sion, as well as to keep it abreast of developing law. The views
of [S]tates and other entities expressed as amici have time
and again proved influential where rules fashioned for the
litigants will likely affect them as well. In instances where the
Court has thought that special expertise would be beneficial,
or where the Court has not been satisfied that a significant
issue would be adequately presented, it has sought out assis-
tance by inviting particular amici. In the Second Circuit, too,
amicus briefs have proved useful by identifying larger issues
not emphasized by the parties, and by filling a vacuum where
representation otherwise is inadequate; that court also has on
occasion invited amicus participation. 70
The Supreme Court Rules expressly dissuade the submis-
sion of arguments duplicative of those presented by the parties.
Rule 37.1 states that the brief "brings to the attention of the
Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the
parties. ''71 Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, observed:
66. Kathryn Kolbert, The Webster Amicus Curiae Briefs: Perspectives on the Abortion Con-
troversy and the Role of the Supreme Court, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 153, 157 (1989).
67. Id.
68. See Ennis, supra note 17, at 604.
69. Id.
70. Kaye, supra note 3, at 13.
71. Sup. CT. R. 37.1.
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The bane of lawyers is prolixity and duplication, and for obvi-
ous reasons is especially marked in commercial cases with
large monetary stakes. In an era of heavy judicial caseloads
and public impatience with the delays and expense of litiga-
tion, we judges should be assiduous to bar the gates to amicus
curiae briefs that fail to present convincing reasons why the
parties' briefs do not give us all the help we need for deciding
the appeal.7 2
One of the ways the federal appellate rules deter amici briefs
that merely reiterate those submitted by the primary litigants is
through the timing of the filings. The amicus brief is not due on
the date the named party's brief is submitted, but may be filed
thereafter,7 3 which affords the amicus time to review the party's
brief to avoid repetition.
A. Amicus Submissions at the Certiorari Stage
Amicus submissions serve different purposes at different
stages of the proceedings. Those supporting a grant of a peti-
tion for certiorari generally present one or more of the following
arguments:
• There is a conflict among the federal courts of appeal
and/or among the supreme courts of multiple States.
* The issue is one of profound importance.
* The decision issued by the court below conflicts with Su-
preme Court precedents.
* The Supreme Court left the issue open when it ruled in
prior cases.
* There is tension among decisions issued previously by the
Supreme Court.7
4
Thus, such briefs are designed to alert the Court to adverse
ramifications were the decision issued by the court below al-
lowed to stand. By illustration, the State of Ohio submitted an
amicus brief in City of Boerne v. Flores,75 which concerned the con-
stitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and its
application to denial of a permit to enlarge a church based on
an ordinance dealing with historic preservation. The amicus
72. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir.
1997) (Posner, J.).
73. See FED. R. App. P. 29(e); see also Harris, supra note 10, at 14-15.
74. See generally Sup. CT. R. 10. See Schweitzer, supra note 55, at 527-28.
75. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See Schweitzer, supra note 55, at 530.
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brief argued that the dispute extended beyond issues exclusively
relating to zoning regulations because it affected State prison
systems. Certiorari was granted even though there was no extant
split in circuit court decisions.76
B. Amicus Submissions at the Merits Stage
Amicus briefs submitted at the merits stage, when either the
Court has granted a writ of certiorari or the appeal has proceeded
as of right, serve myriad purposes. First, the amicus party may
offer guidance as to the legal constructs applicable to the case, as
when the amicus presents alternative or supplementary argu-
ments to support a conclusion or brings to the court's attention
the existence of other pending cases that might bear on the rul-
ing issued. Second, the amicus may be in a position to present
empirical factual information that can help inform the court's
understanding of the pragmatic impact of its decision. Third,
the amicus might persuade a judge by enhancing the credibility
of an argument by virtue of the very nature of the amicus party or
simply due to the fact that increased attention has been placed
on the case in light of the additional involvement of the amicus
demonstrating divergent reach of the law.
1. Presentation of Alternative or Supplementary Arguments
One of the most important ways amicus curiae serve the ad-
ministration of justice is by providing courts with an array of le-
gal rationales that offer either alternative or supplementary
grounds on which to premise rulings. Amici thereby assistjudges
with their efforts to more fully grasp the applicable substantive
law and pragmatic implications of the decisions they craft. Chief
Judge Chris W. Altenbernd of the Second District Court of Ap-
peal of the State of Florida observed that
[a] micus briefs are best used where the court really does need
an objective friend with some expertise. Appellate judges are
about the only general practitioners remaining in Florida.
We must study the law in all of its breadth. Ultimately, we
must rule and possibly create precedent in fields where we
have little personal experience or expertise. 7
7
76. See generally Hares, 521 U.S. at 507. See Schweitzer, supra note 55, at 530.
77. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 2, at 276 n.30 (quoting Chris Altenbernd, Chief
Judge, Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.).
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Because amici are not parties to the case and often represent
somewhat disparate interests, they may present arguments for
more extensive or more narrow relief than those advanced by
the primary litigants. Such amici may be less constrained than
the parties by tactical considerations that affect the overall pos-
ture of the case. For example, a party may decide to confine his
argument to an assertion that the statute in issue is inapplicable
to him; an amicus may assert that the statute is generally unen-
forceable and should be invalidated. Conversely, a party may ar-
gue that the statute in issue is unconstitutional; an amicus may
have an interest in preserving the law while acknowledging that
its application to the party is inappropriate and unlawful.
One example of a case in which the amici sought a more
narrow ruling was Askew v. Sonson.7 s In that case, the Florida Su-
preme Court considered the plaintiffs' allegation that their "root
of title" had remained of record and unchallenged for more
than thirty years.79 The defendants contended that the applica-
tion of the Marketable Record Title Act against them would be
unconstitutional because the lands in issue had been designated
for school purposes under an Act of Congress that granted lands
to the State of Florida."° The court expressly characterized the
briefs filed by the parties and the amici as "excellent," noting:
The order requesting additional briefs restated and broad-
ened the questions initially presented, so as to include the
application of the marketable record title act to all [S]tate
lands, of which section sixteen lands are merely one category.
The question framed by the Court encompasses all categories
of [S]tate properties, including sovereignty lands. Among
the other categories of [S]tate properties are internal im-
provement lands, swamp and overflow lands, railroad lands,
indemnity lands, and Murphy Act lands. The amici curiae
urge the Court to reserve ruling on those arguments until
they are presented in the context of a proper controversy. In
other words, they urge us to confine our ruling to the ques-
tion initially presented."'
The court accepted the amici's contention that the broader
question of the statute's application to State-owned lands gener-
78. 409 S.2d 7 (Fla. 1981).
79. See id. at 7.
80. See id. at 7-8.
81. Id. at 8.
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ally should be deferred and ruled on a more narrow question.
The court noted:
It is a wise rule that courts will only determine issues which
are based on a genuine controversy, supported by a sufficient
factual predicate. This rule is particularly appropriate where
complex issues of great public interest are concerned. This
Court has stated that it will not address issues, particularly
those of constitutional import, which are neither directly
presented nor necessary to the resolution of the dispute at
hand. 2
An example of a case in which the amici sought to broaden
the scope of the court's determination can be found in Braschi v.
Stahl Associates Co., which addressed tenants' rights.8 3 In that
case, the ACLU represented the named plaintiff, the surviving
gay life partner of the prime tenant, on his appeal to the New
York Court of Appeals. The plaintiff faced eviction from a rent-
controlled apartment after his partner, the prime tenant, died.
The amici curiae emphasized the civil rights aspect of the case
and broadened the claim beyond the gay community. For ex-
ample, The Legal Aid Society argued that its poor clients
lived together as families without legal sanction because in
many cases they could not afford lawyers to get divorces or
adoptions. The City of New York, the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Community Action for Legal Ser-
vices, Gay Men's Health Crisis, Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund and others pointed out to the [S]tate's high-
est court how the court's ruling would widely impact the com-
munity and demonstrated the breadth of the political support
for the position. In a landmark decision, the New York Court
of Appeals in Braschi, held that family included non-legally
recognized relationships for purposes of succession rights to
rent controlled apartments.8 4
A corollary point is that an amicus may wish to emphasize a
point that received scant attention from the parties, lest the issue
be overlooked or relegated to cursory review. The presentation
by an amicus of arguments supplementary to those put forth by a
party in the suit has two significant purposes. First, the amicus
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. See generally 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989).
84. Lynn M. Kelly, Lauyering for Poor Communities on the Cusp of the Next Centuiy, 25
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 721, 723-24 (1998).
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may effectively provide the court with additional rationales in
support of the desired holding, thereby fortifying the court's
conviction in its conclusion and buttressing the bases of its analy-
sis. Perhaps, as well, such supplementary analyses may persuade
a justice to concur in a plurality opinion on another ground.
A notable example of the presentation by amici of an alter-
native argument is Mapp, in which the Supreme Court consid-
ered an appeal by a woman convicted of knowing possession of
lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs in violation
of Ohio's penal code.85 The appellant challenged the constitu-
tionality of the obscenity statute.86 The ACLU, appearing as ami-
cus, urged the Court to review Wolf v. Colorado, in which the
Court previously had held "that in a prosecution in a State court
for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid
the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure."87 The Mapp Court observed that "appellant chose
to urge what may have appeared to be the surer ground for
favorable disposition and did not insist that Wolf be over-
ruled . "..."88 Indeed, when counsel for appellant was "pressed"
during oral argument as to whether he was urging the Court to
overrule Wolf, he "expressly disavowed any such purpose."89
Instead, it was "the amicus curiae, who was also permitted to
participate in the oral argument, [who] urge[d] the Court to
overrule WolfW" 9 0 which was the ground upon which the majority
Court rested its decision to reverse. Ultimately, the Court con-
cluded that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissi-
ble in a state court.
'191
Second, an alternative or supplementary doctrinal frame-
85. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
86. See id. at 646; see also id. at 672-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating "the new and
pivotal issue brought to the Court by this appeal is whether § 2905.35 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code making criminal the mere knowing possession or control of obscene mate-
rial, and under which appellant has been convicted, is consistent with the rights of free
thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.
That was the principal issue which was decided by the Ohio Supreme Court, which was
tendered by appellant's Jurisdictional Statement, and which was briefed and argued in
this Court.") (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted)).
87. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
88. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 n.3.
89. Id. at 673 n.6 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 646 n.3.
91. Id. at 655.
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work offered by an amicus may affect the way that the court's
ruling is applied to the amicus party. It may influence the dispo-
sition of subsequent litigation, even when the rationale is rele-
gated to mere dicta. As Supreme CourtJustice Arthur Goldberg
observed, "A traditional function of an amicus is to assert 'an in-
terest of its own separate and distinct from that of the [par-
ties]' . . . . It is 'customary for those whose rights [depend] on
the outcome of cases .. .to file briefs amicus curiae, in order to
protect their own interests.' Th[e] Court has recognized the
power of federal courts to appoint 'amici to represent the public
interest in the administration ofjustice."92 This is especially im-
portant in the context of amicus briefs submitted on behalf of
under-represented litigants, whose positions may not be high-
lighted adequately in judicial, legislative, and other contexts.
Furthermore, such litigants might benefit prospectively from
court rulings that effectively deter potential exposure for liability
and the ensuing costs and burdens associated with having to de-
fend against claims that otherwise could have been deemed cog-
nizable.
One example of a Supreme Court justice's reliance on ami-
cus briefing to frame his opinion is that written for the majority
Court by Justice Anthony Kennedy in Romer v. Evans.93 The
Court noted that the Colorado law in issue effectively placed
homosexuals "in a solitary class with respect to transactions and
relations in both the private and governmental spheres. The
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, spe-
cific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination,
and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies."94 Much
of the analysis was consistent with the arguments put forth in an
amici brief submitted by, among others, Laurence Tribe of
Harvard Law School, that the law constituted a per se violation of
the equal protection guarantees embodied in the Fourth
Amendment. 5
Even when the court rejects an amicus' position, its decision
may reflect consideration of the arguments put forth. One illus-
tration of a State court case in which the court's comments
92. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 738 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
93. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See Lucas, supra note 2, at 1610.
94. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627.
95. See Lucas, supra note 2, at 1609.
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about the amicus brief substantiated the court's review was Polar-
oid v. Travelers Indem. Co.,9 6 in which a Massachusetts court ad-
dressed issues raised by an amicus when it upheld the refusal by
insurers to settle pollution claims of the insured.9"
Another purpose of amicus briefs is to apprise a court of the
possible consequences of a particular ruling that might not be
readily apparent from the context of the proceeding. Amici can
serve an important function in this manner by alerting the court
to practical, albeit potentially unintended, effects of its decisions
in ways that the litigants either have not considered or with
which they are not concerned. For example, a ruling might af-
fect a type of party that is not before the court. This potential
effect is especially significant in the context of amicus filings by
underprivileged litigants, who may be susceptible to having a
court fail to appreciate the effects on them or on a not-for-profit
organization of a decision issued in a commercial dispute.
2. Presentation of Empirical, Scientific, or Other
Technical Data
In addition, amicus submissions at the merits stage can fur-
nish the court with empirical factual information that is not nec-
essarily contained Within the appellate record. Such matter is
known colloquially as a "Brandeis Brief' 8 after a brief filed by
Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon.9 9 In that case, Louis Brandeis
had marshaled evidence about the hazardous effects of long
work hours on women's health and presented it to the Court in
support of an argument that the public interest would best be
served if the number of hours worked by women was regulated.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court relied on Brandeis Briefs in
such landmark rulings as Brown v. Board of Edu. of Topeka,'0 0 in
which the Court cited several social science publications to sup-
port its conclusion that segregation generates a feeling of inferi-
ority among African-Americans. In Roe v. Wade,'' the Court re-
lied on numerous submissions by legal, medical, and religious
organizations to discuss the physical risks of abortion at various
96. 610 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1993).
97. See generally Lucas, supra note 2, at 1610.
98. Such factual information also has been referred to as "legislative facts."
99. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
100. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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stages of pregnancy and beliefs regarding the beginning of life,
referring at length in the opinion to the information reviewed.
In Doe v. Bolton,10 2 a companion case to Roe v. Wade, the Court
referred to "many" studies that showed that it is safer for a wo-
man to have a medically induced abortion than to bear a
child." 3
The nature of factual information reviewed by courts may
range from the presentation of scientific or other technical data
to an explication of historical practice or jurisprudence. The
"main contribution," and, arguably, the primary source of poten-
tial mischief of Brandeis Briefs, has been described as a means of
"mak[ing] extra-legal data readily available to the court. "104
Such submissions have been controversial in light of their pres-
entation of empirical data that has not necessarily been tested
through an adversarial evidentiary process in the courts below.
One commentator observed, "[b]y keeping the contours of the
amicus concept nebulous and within the realm of judicial discre-
tion, courts have been able to use the amicus curiae as a tool to
surpass the limitations placed on the court by an adversary sys-
tem of justice."1 °5
The Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate the admission
of expert testimony "if scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact . . ,106 When scientific
evidence is proffered at the trial level, it must undergo a rigor-
ous analysis, consistent with factors enumerated by the Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,"°7 that are designed
to assess the studies' reliability and relevance. By contrast, ami-
cus briefs comprising factual information are not under such
constraints. Nor are they necessarily tested through the adver-
sarial process, in which a party objecting to the methodology,
statistical analysis, or conclusions of the study can challenge the
evidence by presenting testimony elicited from an opposing ex-
pert witness or by proffering contrary data.
102. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 116.
103. See Doe, 410 U.S. at 217 n.5.
104. McClesky v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 888 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Peter W.
Sperlich, Social Science Evidence and the Courts: Reaching Beyond the Advisory Process, 63
JUDICATURE 280, 285 n.31 (1980)), affd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), superceded &y statute as
stated in Baker v. Duckworth, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10805 (7th Cir. May 7, 1997).
105. Lowman, supra note 9, at 1247.
106. FED. R. EVID. 702 (2004).
107. 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
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Many have also questioned whether appellate courts are ad-
equately equipped to evaluate the methodology of research data
or to give sufficient credence to such indicia as whether the re-
search has been peer reviewed. The proffer of scientific evi-
dence, including social scientific evidence, prompted some to re-
call the admonition repeated by Mark Twain that "[t]here are
three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics."' 0 8 More for-
mal processes may be needed for consideration of the qualifica-
tions of the principal investors, and of their sources of funding,
which in turn may implicate bias or, arguably, nearly as deleteri-
ous, the appearance of bias.
Others have a different perspective. Justice Stephen Breyer
lauded amici participation as playing "important roles in educat-
ing the judges on potentially relevant technical matters" and
cited as an example the utility of discussions by amici of palliative
care, which helped the Court as it grappled with end-of-life is-
sues "identify areas of technical consensus and disagreement."' 0 9
Thus, the degree to which medical science can mitigate the risk
of death in severe pain informed the analysis as to whether the
right to assisted suicide is a liberty of constitutional propor-
tions. l ' With respect to whether it is critical for arbiters to util-
ize scientific findings, consider as well the perspective of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who stated, "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience." 1 '
Some have observed that
[t]he alternative to admitting social science data is to return
to nineteenth century legal formalism, according to which
justice or other powerful groups substitute their own norma-
tive beliefs for scientific findings.... Third-party amici pro-
viding social science data can be an important check against
governmental abuse of power .... The problem of integrat-
ing social science research into constitutional decision-mak-
ing is "complicated by the fact that not all social science is
108. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 93 & n.3 (1993) (citing MARK
TWAIN, I MARK TWAIN's AuTOBIOGRAPv 246 (1924)) (noting that Mark Twain attrib-
uted statement to Benjamin Disraeli).
109. Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24, 26
(1998).
110. See id. at 24-25.
111. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881).
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created equal." ' 12
These commentators suggested that concerns about amici's prof-
fer of scientific data could be mitigated, among other ways, by
the judicial appointment of social science experts such as advi-
sory panels with whom the Court could consult on issues relating
to data interpretation, by the commission of studies and submis-
sion of factual disputes to specialized social science courts analo-
gous to specialized courts such as the Court of Customs or the
Court of Patent Appeals, and by the creation of a research
agency devoted to law and policy issues that require extra-legal
investigations. 13
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit "remark [ed]
that the prime, if not sole, purpose of an amicus curiae brief is
what its name implies, namely, to assist the court on matters of
law. While, presumably, an amicus' position on the legal issues
coincides with one of the parties, this does not mean that it is to
engage in assisting that party with its evidentiary claims."' 14 One
commentator was particularly troubled about the use of facts
outside the record in the participation of private amicus interests
in criminal proceedings,' 15 warning "the introduction of extra-
record facts by a private party could raise significant due-process
concerns.",
1 16
A notable example in a recent case where Brandeis Briefs
were submitted is Washington v. Glucksberg,117 which addressed a
state prohibition on physician-assisted suicide. Critical to the Su-
112. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 108, at 161-62 (quoting David L. Faigman, To
Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38
EMORY LJ. 1005, 1079 (1989)). Faigman noted that "The legal relevance of social sci-
ence research simply cannot be divorced from its scientific credibility." Faigman, supra,
at 1081.
113. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 108, at 158-59.
114. Baneijee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College, 648 F.2d 61, 65 n.9 (lst Cir.
1981) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981).
115. See Walbolt & Lang, supra note 2, at 296.
116. Id. at 296 & n.157 (citing Stumbo v. Seabold, 704 F.2d 910, 911-12 (6th Cir.
1983) (granting writ of habeas corpus for depriving defendant of due process when facts
were cited and arguments were made to jury that were not supported by record evi-
dence)). Of course, amicus submissions in support of the criminal defendant may work
to help protect the rights of the accused, whereas those submitted on behalf of the
prosecutor may at least in some circumstances jeopardize due process and other rights,
especially if the latter's arguments are not the target of rebuttal arguments by the de-
fense or other amici.
117. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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preme Court's determination were briefs filed by medical per-
sonnel, such as the American Medical Association, which re-
viewed the ethical principles for physicians and the efficacy of
palliation on chronic pain." 8
When the Florida Supreme Court considered a related issue
in a case seeking a declaratory judgment that a Florida statute
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional, the
court pointedly noted that persons with serious disabilities have
a "vital interest" in the matter and cited an amicus brief submit-
ted by the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities." 9 The
court also looked to a consolidated submission by the American
Medical Association, the Florida Hospices, the Florida Medical
Association, the Florida Nurses Association, the Florida Osteo-
pathic Medical Association, the Florida Society of Internal
Medicine, the Florida Society of Thoracic and Cardiovascular
Surgeons, noting that "while not all healthcare providers agree
on the issue, the leading healthcare organizations are unani-
mous in their opposition to legalizing assisted suicide."2 0 Both
the amici's expertise and their consensus were plainly significant
to the court; this was vividly apparent in the court's rhetorical
question: "Who would have more knowledge of the dangers of
legalizing assisted suicide than those intimately charged with
maintaining the patient's well-being?"'
Controversial social and political issues such as those per-
taining to end-of-life decisional rights have generated a predomi-
nance of cases surveyed in which twenty or more amicus briefs
were filed.' 2 2 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, another right-
to-die case, generated thirty-nine amicus submissions. 23 Other
issues triggering more voluminous amicus briefing include abor-
tion, affirmative action, church-state relations, free speech, and
118. See Brief of the American Medical Ass'n, et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, "Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 76-110). Schweitzer
offers another example; in City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), an ordinance
designed to prevent loitering was challenged on constitutional grounds. The Center
for the Community Interest filed an amicus brief that pointed to actual harm caused by
gangs in urban areas and community responses. See Schweitzer, supra note 55, at 532.
119. Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 101-02 (Fla. 1997).
120. Id. at 103-04.
121. Id. at 104.
122. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 51, at 755.
123. 497 U.S. 261, 329 (1990).
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the takings of property. 12  In Webster v. Reprod. Health ServS., 125
for example, the Court considered the parameters of abortion
rights. Seventy-eight amicus briefs were filed; of these, forty-six
supported the petitioner, the Attorney General of Missouri who
argued that Roe v. Wade should be overturned, and thirty-two
supported the respondents, who endorsed the re-affirmation of
Roe v. Wade.
3. Amicus Attention to the Proceeding
Amicus participation may be a means of influencing a court
because increased attention has been brought to a case. Amici
can help illuminate the impact of a court's ultimate decision.
Further, an amicus party might help buttress the credibility of a
party's argument by virtue of the nature of the amicus.
In Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, for example, the court con-
sidered whether billboards could be excluded from certain areas
of a city for the purpose of "'eliminat[ing] hazards to pedestri-
ans and motorists brought by distracting sign displays' and 'to
preserve and improve the appearance of the City' ... . ,126 Ap-
pellants were companies engaged in the outdoor advertising bus-
iness who wished to display commercial messages. The appel-
lants agreed that the lesser constitutional protections accorded
to commercial speech applied, but contended that the San Di-
ego ordinance could not meet even that standard. 127
The ACLU, appearing as amicus, was in a better position to
highlight the ways in which the law might chill political speech,
which historically has received more solicitude than commercial
speech.128 The Supreme Court ultimately struck the ordinance,
notwithstanding that a majority deemed its regulation of com-
mercial speech to be constitutional.129 Possibly the amicus par-
ticipant transmuted the ordinance's infirmity from one not only
impacting commercial speech, but to one worthy of scrutiny
under the more exacting standard applied to political speech.
124. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 51, at 755.
125. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
126. 453 U.S. 490, 493 (1981) (citing San Diego Ordinance No. 10795 (New Se-
ries), enacted Mar. 14, 1972).
127. See id. at 506-08.
128. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 6, at 1626 & n.153; Ennis, supra note 17, at 607
(noting that the Court was closely divided).
129. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 506-08.
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V. AMICUS BRIEFING IN NON-U S. AND MULTI-NATIONAL
COURTS TO ADVANCE THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Notwithstanding the concomitant self-interest of an amicus
party, the facilitation of an informed, deliberative, and fair-
minded court ruling is among the most laudable purposes of an
amicus submission. Non-U.S. and multi-national perspectives can
be presented through amicus filings as a viable means of offering
a court alternative analytical approaches founded on established
jurisprudence or empirical experience. Not-for-profit and indi-
gent amici can alert the Court to the interests of under-repre-
sented groups and individuals, who otherwise might not have
their concerns brought to the court's attention by commercial or
other litigants. This opportunity is especially important in lo-
cales where not-for-profit and similar litigating amici do not exist
to represent the interests of the underprivileged.
A. Amicus Submissions in International Courts
In the international arena, amicus submissions can play a val-
uable role by presenting diverse experiences and perspectives to
a court that may not previously have confronted the issue it must
adjudicate. One commentator notes that "[i]ndividuals and
human rights [non-governmental organizations ("] NGOs [")] in
Europe and the Americas have exploited the concept of the ami-
cus curiae as a mechanism for participating in, and shaping the
course of, human rights adjudication before the European
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights."1 ' The Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights historically considered issues relating to forced disappear-
ances, extra-judicial executions and torture, and, more recently,
has been confronted with issues of public interest significance,
including those relating to violations of due process and delays
in judicial proceedings. 31 In these contexts, "[a]micus briefs
have . . . provided comparative law analysis and practical infor-
mation that the Court otherwise would have been unable to ac-
130. Abdelsalam A. Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participation in Human Rights
Litigation Before the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights: Lessons From the European
and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 8 M.S.U. J. IN-r'L L. 377, 384 (1999).
131. See Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 195, 202 (2004).
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quire. '"132
The European Court of Human Rights has accepted amicus
submissions in cases involving fair trial, freedom of information,
privacy, and arbitrary detention by individuals, professional orga-
nizations, human rights NGOs, and governments.1 33 One survey
indicated that in 1994, the court found violations in seventy-five
percent of the cases in which amicus briefs were filed; absent ami-
cus participation, violations reportedly were found in only fifty
percent of the cases. 134 The court has discretion to invite any
High Contracting Party who is not a party to the proceedings or
any person other than the applicant claiming to be a victim of a
violation to submit written comments or participate in hear-
ings. 3 5
Abdelsalam A. Radwan Alfog-hi Mohamed pointed out the
impact of an amicus brief submitted by Amnesty International
among several examples of the influence of such briefs on the
adjudication of human rights. 136 The brief was excerpted and
adopted in the court's ruling in Soering v. United Kingdom, which
concerned British responsibility for the extradition of a defen-
dant accused with a capital offense in the United States. 1
37
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has relied on
amicus filings, even occasionally exercising its discretion to solicit
submissions by interested groups and allowing oral argument by
such groups.13 8 The European Court of Justice uses a system of
Advocates General, who represent the public interest.13 9 In one
case concerning the supremacy of Community law, the Advocate
General appeared as amicus curiae before the Court. 4 °
Mohamed noted that "It]he practice of the [European] Court
[of Justice] in relation to amicus intervention has been so exten-
132. Mohamed, supra note 130, at 389.
133. See id. at 385.
134. See Dinah Shelton, Non-Governmental Organizations and Judicial Proceedings, 88
AM.J. INT'L. L. 611, 637 (1994).
135. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established
Thereby, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155, art. 35(1).
136. See Mohamed, supra note 130, at 386.
137. [1989] 11 E.H.R.R. 439, [1989] E.C.H.R. 14038/88.
138. See Mohamed, supra note 130, at 391.
139. See Shelton, supra note 134, at 629.
140. See id. at 629 & nn.108-09 (citing Costa v. Enel, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R.
1143, [1964] C.M.L.R. 435).
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sive that on some occasions the Court has exercised its discretion
and called upon interested groups to present their views and,
more importantly, to be heard orally by the Court." '141
Professor Dinah Shelton noted that NGOs are playing an
increasingly important role in international litigation, including
through the submission of amicus briefs. She concluded,
"[n]ational and regional human rights tribunals have shown the
usefulness of amicus briefs in reaching well-reasoned and accu-
rate opinions. Such briefs have provided information to the
courts beyond what the parties have been willing or able to sub-
mit. They also have aided in the resolution of new or technical
issues and provided an alternative viewpoint where there is no
true adversarial position between the petitioner and the respon-
dent.1 4 2
Amicus briefs submitted in the context of international dis-
putes also offer an opportunity to address matters of policy
rather than more pointedly "assessing the merits of the specific
dispute," 4 ' which is where the parties typically direct their focus.
Amici who appeared in a U.S. Supreme Court case concerning
the international arbitration of statutory claims, for instance, em-
phasized "policy justifications for reaching alternate potential
outcomes."144
B. Pro Bono Representation of Amici
It has been observed that "[d]irect lawyer pro bono service
'remains a vital component of any plan for legal access."" 45
Among the most obvious benefits of pro bono lawyering in public
interest litigation is the saving of legal fees. Other benefits in-
clude "help[ing to] lend prestige and weight to a case or a
cause.... mak[ing] a case more politically palatable," and pro-
viding substantive experience. 14 6 Professor Martha Davis cites as
141. Mohamed, supra note 130, at 391.
142. See Shelton, supra note 134, at 611, 640.
143. Dora Marta Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration:
The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 923, 938
(2003).
144. Id.
145. Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice: The United States' Failure to Recognize a
Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 317, 330 (2001) (quoting Talbot
D'Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, 73 FLA. B.J., Apr. 1999, at
19).
146. Martha F. Davis, Historical Perspectives on Pro Bono Lawyering: Our Better Half: A
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an example the request by the Center on Social Welfare Policy
and Law (subsequently known as the Welfare Law Center) to Ar-
chibald Cox to handle the re-argument in the Supreme Court in
Shapiro v. Thompson,"' a case that considered the right of welfare
recipients to travel.148 After briefing by Legal Services lawyers
who were familiar with the case, Davis notes that Cox, a former
U.S. Solicitor General, "was able to go into the Court and take
command of the argument in a way that would be very hard for a
Legal Services lawyer to do. Many considered Cox's handling of
Shapiro to be pivotal in the Court's decision to overturn waiting
period requirements in [S]tate welfare programs."' 49 Pro bono
representation of amici has benefits to the administration of jus-
tice analogous to those of pro bono representation of litigants.
Christina M. Cerna, of the Organization of American States'
Secretariat for the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, recommended that law schools incorporate course cur-
ricula relating to the Inter-American system for the protection of
human rights.15 ° In addition, schools could create a legal aid
clinic to assist petitioners to pursue their rights before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights. 15 1  Such academic
training and clinical inculcation also could help spur attention
to multi-national human rights violations and inspire interest
and expertise in pro bono participation as amicus counsel.
Pro bono representation of not-for-profit or indigent amici in
the international arena may be accommodated fairly easily, not-
withstanding constraints on time and resources that might other-
wise inhibit acceptance of pro bono cases. The amicus counsel typ-
ically can research applicable law and write the brief as his daily
schedule permits, within applicable filing deadlines. Because
necessary resources generally involve computerized legal
databases and word processing functionality to which many law-
yers already have access, the costs relating to such representa-
tions are manageable (at least when extensive empirical investi-
Public Interest Lauyer Reflects on Pro Bono Lawyering and Social Change Litigation, 9 Am. U.J.
GENDER SOC. POL' & L. 119, 120-21 (2001).
147. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
148. See Davis, supra note 146, at 120 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969)).
149. Id. at 120.
150. See Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 195, 211 (2004).
151. Id.
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gation is not contemplated). Unlike other types of pro bono
work, expenses for expert witnesses, forensic testing, deposition
costs, and the like, are absent. The filing itself may be coordi-
nated through affiliation with a local lawyer in the non-U.S.juris-
diction, thereby securing advice about procedural requirements
and local practice, facilitating relationships with non-U.S. coun-
sel, and sensitizing another lawyer to public interest needs.
More significantly, such work can be very gratifying. As well,
it appears to be efficacious. Review of the submission of amicus
briefs in public interest litigation suggests "a significant im-
pact."15 2 One case in which the amicus party has been widely
credited with shaping the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion is
Mapp. 5 ' There, the Supreme Court, addressing the exclusion-
ary rule, premised its decision on the concluding point advanced
by the ACLU and its fellow amici. Somewhat ironically, the pub-
lic interest may have been better served had the appellant pre-
vailed in her challenge to the State obscenity statute, especially
because her conviction was predicated on the "knowing posses-
sion of four little pamphlets, a couple of photographs and a little
pencil doodle .. .[which] the appellant - and a friend of hers
- said were odds and ends belonging to a recent boarder, a
man who had left suddenly for New York and had been detained
there. 1 54
The ACLU, appearing as amicus, argued in favor of the ex-
clusionary rule ultimately adopted by the Court.15 5 The ACLU
thus offered the Court an alternative, highly significant rationale
for its holding, which advanced the cause of criminal justice.
Justice William 0. Douglas, concurring in the decision, acknowl-
edged the existence of "theoretical remedies" to the "'shabby
business' of unlawful entry into a home," including self-scrutiny
and disciplinary action within the hierarchy of the police system
and an action for trespass by the homeowner against the offend-
ing officer.'5 6 But such avenues are "mainly illusory" in light of
the disincentives for a district attorney to prosecute himself or
fellow associates for well-meaning violations of the search and
152. Shelton, supra note 134, at 619.
153. 367 U.S. 643, 673 nn.5-6 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 668-69 (Douglas, J., concurring).
155. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
156. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 670 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25, 46 (1949)).
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seizure clause and the "meager relief' available to a citizen who
pursues an onerous trespass suit.157 Justice Douglas concluded
that "[w] ithout judicial action. making the exclusionary rule ap-
plicable to the States, Wolf v. Colorado in practical effect reduced
the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to 'a
dead letter' . . .158
It was the ACLU as amicus who helped persuade the Court
to this conclusion, although the extent of the ACLU's own em-
phasis of the point has been questioned. Justice John M. Harlan,
dissenting in Mapp, noted that while "l[t] he appellant's brief did
not urge the overruling of Wol][; i]ndeed it did not even cite the
case," the brief of the American and Ohio Civil Liberties Unions,
appearing as amici, "did in one short concluding paragraph of its
argument 'request' the Court to re-examine and overrule Wolf,
but without argumentation. 159
Regardless of the extent to which the ACLU argued the ex-
clusionary rule point, the Court's opinion makes clear by its ref-
erence to the ACLU that the ACLU spurred consideration of the
argument, which in turn helped shape the Court's rationale for
its holding. Amicus participation, including facilitating such par-
ticipation on a pro bono basis, can be critical to ensuring that the
interests of under-represented litigants are put before the court.
This is especially important in light of the development of litigat-
ing amici, who have been created or supported to promote com-
mercial interests, 160 and the extensive participation as amicus by
the government, 161 neither of which are necessarily as pre-dis-
posed to emphasizing the interests of underprivileged factions.
C. Utility of Amicus Participation
Notwithstanding the potential impact by amici on judicial
decisions, participation in litigation through the amicus device in
U.S. and international court practice has both advantages and
disadvantages. As an advocacy mechanism, it is generally less ex-
pensive than lobbying efforts or the mounting of an extensive
publicity campaign. Amicus participation also is less costly than
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Wolf 338 U.S. at 47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
159. Id. at 673 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
160. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 176-79.
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the initiation of a separate lawsuit by the interested party. From
a procedural standpoint, amicus participation by a non-govern-
mental amicus is not cumbersome, generally requiring that the
amicus elicit the consent of the parties or submit a short motion
for leave.
Furthermore, although means for involvement in a lawsuit
are available through various options, such as joining a class ac-
tion, becoming a co-party through joinder, or moving to inter-
vene, prerequisites for amici are more informal and flexible.
They are considerably easier to fulfill than those pertaining, for
instance, to a motion for intervention in the suit. One may in-
tervene as of right only when a statute of the United States con-
fers an unconditional right to intervene, or "when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or im-
pede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing par-
ties. " "' Generally, one may intervene with permission only
when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to
intervene, or when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. 63 By contrast,
an amicus typically offers a general interest in the ongoing litiga-
tion.
Moreover, while amici are dissuaded from merely echoing a
party's brief, amici can expound on nuances of arguments that
were inartfully or cursorily asserted. An amicus who has been
adversely affected as an individual by enforcement of a law that a
corporate litigant is contesting may be able to poignantly present
the law's ramifications through personal perspective and in ei-
detic detail. Nor are amici presumptively constrained to address
solely the issues framed by the parties through their briefing.
Through the device of Brandeis Briefs, amici may also proffer
factual information that dehors the record in the case.' 64
In addition, amici are not directly bound by the decision.
Moreover, while principles of stare decisis may operate once an
appellate or supreme court has issued its decision, amici likely
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
163. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
164. See supra notes 98-125 and accompanying text.
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are not prevented by res judicata or collateral estoppel from liti-
gating identical issues in another case.
Unlike parties to the suit, however; amici at an intermediate
appellate level do not automatically have another avenue to pur-
sue. Chief Judge Kaye succinctly noted the unique position of
amici in litigation: "[t]hey can contribute but they can't com-
plain." '165
Nor do amici control the management or tactical considera-
tions of the proceedings. Indeed, in one case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit criticized the district court for, in
effect, elevating the amicus to a party having "full litigating rights
of a named party," including the ability to file pleadings, con-
duct discovery, present and compel the attendance of witnesses,
proffer evidence at hearings, and issue subpoenas.
1 66
Thus, a party supported by an amicus may assert a position
that the amicus regards as strategically inappropriate. In addi-
tion, absent leave of the court, amici generally do not participate
in oral argument, and therefore do not have an opportunity to
address or clarify issues with which the court is grappling after
the briefing has been completed.
The advantages of pro bono support for amicus participation
may be amplified in the international arena, where "amicus status
may be the only available avenue of participation in many inter-
national cases."'1 67 The benefits of such participation also may
be apparent in public interest litigation, where an indigent or
poorly-resourced litigant lacks adequate representation and ami-
cus support advocates for a more promising disposition. Moreo-
ver, when underprivileged litigants are pitted against well-
resourced adversaries, the latter may have enlisted amicus sup-
port that, absent pro bono representation of opposing amici,
would be left unchallenged or would be disproportionately rep-
resented in the proceedings.
165. Kaye, supra note 3, at 13.
166. United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 162-64 (6th Cir. 1990) (describing
trial court's treatment of amicus as "mutant" and ruling that litigating amicus had no
standing to exercise rights as named party or real party in interest), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
925 (1994).
167. Shelton, supra note 134, at 612.
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VI. ISSUES RELATING TO THE SUBMISSION OF
AMICUS FILINGS
Although the submission of briefs by amici can promote a
greater understanding by the court of the potential impact and
policy implications of its ruling, a number of issues have been
raised about the advisability and utility of amicus participation.
Generally, such concerns do not obviate the usefulness of amicus
participation, but simply counsel against unfettered availability
of the device irrespective of procedural and other safeguards.
The issues surrounding the role of amici curiae are particularly
worthy of attention in circumstances when the use of such brief-
ing is encouraged in order to protect the rights of underprivi-
leged parties.
A. The Partisan Nature of Amicus Filings
Amicus participation has been criticized on the ground that
in recent times the amicus has been transmuted from its histori-
cal origins of "friend of the court" to "friend of the party." Con-
cern has been expressed that the amicus process has lost sight of
the entity that it is designed to serve.
However, it is not realistic to presuppose a framework in
which amici participate with inherent neutrality. They have en-
tered the vortex of litigation in order to express a view and pro-
tect their interests. The attorney representing the amicus is ethi-
cally bound to advance the amicus' position as advocate for his
client.168
Nor is it necessary to the integrity of the process to aspire to
such neutrality. The court serves as the impartial arbiter of the
proceedings and is assisted in its function in two critical ways.
First, the fundamental nature of an adversarial process contem-
plates and accommodates the presentation of point and counter-
point; distortions of law or fact by a party, whether appearing as
a primary litigant or as an amicus party, may be challenged and
rebutted by the opposing litigant or by another amicus. Second,
the court is assisted by one or more clerks whose paramount pro-
fessional focus rests with the court.
Amici curiae assist the court by expounding fair and impar-
tial statements of relevant law and facts, so that the court is well
168. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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positioned to appreciate competing considerations. Because ad-
vocacy in the context of litigation regularly positions the argu-
ment, within ethical constraints, in the most favorable and per-
suasive light for the party asserting it, it is helpful to promote the
acceptance of amicus filings so that additional amici are more
likely to present alternative viewpoints and rebut misguided ar-
guments.
In some situations, dueling amici may be absent from the
case or there otherwise may be potential for distortion of a posi-
tion because of a preponderance of more interested, more moti-
vated, or better-resourced amici on one side of the equation. In
those circumstances, the judiciary should be vigilant to search
for distortion. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia ob-
served that even though "[t]here is no self-interested organiza-
tion out there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal
courts[, t]he expectation is ... that th[e] Court will have that
interest prominently - indeed, primarily - in mind. ' 169 Some-
times courts invite prospective amici to participate. In addition,
the court could entertain a motion by the putatively disadvan-
taged litigant to extend his page limitations to allow increased
opportunity for rebuttal of more conspicuously advanced posi-
tions.
B. Potential Distortion of Competing Interests
Militating against the receptivity by courts of amicus submis-
sions is "a legitimate institutional concern about opening the
floodgates to participation by every individual and association in-
terested in its proceedings."' ° From a practical standpoint, fa-
cilitating increased submission of amici filings through the for-
mulation of court rules and judicially-established practice may
have the unintended effect of escalating submissions by well-
resourced, commercial or governmental parties, to the detri-
ment of under-served persons and entities.
Twenty years ago, the U.S. government's petitions to the
U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari were estimated to have been
169. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Shelton, supra note 134, at 624. Shelton proposed that the International
Court of Justice interpret the term "international organization," which are those enti-
ties eligible to participate in amicus filings, to mean non-governmental organizations
with consultative status at the United Nations. See id. at 625.
[Vol. 28:88
2004] THE UTILITY OF PRO BONO REPRESENTATION 121
granted at an annual rate of nearly eighty percent, and in ap-
proximately eighty percent of those cases, the U.S. government's
position on the merits was supported. 7' Indeed, one of the
three major duties of the U.S. Solicitor General is to present the
U.S. government's views as amicus curiae in those cases of interest
where the U.S. government is not a party.172 Unlike other pro-
spective amici, the government need not secure the parties' con-
sent or move for leave of court to submit an amicus brief.173
Sometimes, the Court even suggests that the Solicitor General
file an amicus brief, issuing "invitations which are treated like or-
ders."174
Theoretically, the U.S. government is allowed enhanced ac-
cess to the Court because it is perceived as representing the pub-
lic interest and has greater means of acquiring "expertise and
data on an array of social interests to aid courts in the decision-
making process. 175 Nevertheless, "although purporting to act in
the public interest, the Solicitor General has, at times, argued
for positions that were more in line with the presidential admin-
istration's policies and supported less by Supreme Court prece-
dent.' '1 7
6
Commercial parties, industry groups, and other well-
resourced persons or entities typically have superior access to le-
gal representation. Not only does this affect the frequency with
which amicus briefs may be filed on their behalf, but it also may
affect the quality of such submissions. One commentator noted
that "[t]he Court's inability to give exhaustive consideration to
each petition for review encourages it to use authorship as a
'quality cue.' ' 1 7 7 Another opined that "[t]here are certain
groups and individuals the court pays particular attention to be-
cause they have built up a certain credibility with the court over
171. See 1984 ATr'v GEN. ANN. REp. 5.
172. See General Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General, 28 C.FR.
§ 0.20(c) (1989). Other responsibilities include presenting or overseeing the govern-
ment's arguments when it is a party before the Supreme Court and deciding when the
government should seek review by the Supreme Court after it has been defeated in an
appellate court. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a)-(b).
173. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
174. James L. Cooper, The Solicitor General and the Evolution of Activism, 65 INn. L.J.
675, 680 (1990).
175. Sorenson, supra note 38, at 1234.
176. Id. at 1235.
177. Cooper, supra note 174, at 684 (footnote omitted).
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the years. '1 78 Thus, for example, "[r]epeat players such as the
Solicitor General are especially likely to emerge favorably from
such a process.' 79 This heightens the need for underprivileged
litigants to receive competent assistance.
Interested groups may orchestrate the submission of a high
volume of amicus briefs in an apparent effort "to generate the
impression of powerful interest group support for the outcome
desired."'8 ° In Webster v. Reprod. Health Serus., for instance, the
plurality acknowledged that while a woman's interest in having
an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the due process
clause, States may regulate abortion procedures in ways that per-
missibly furthers the State's interest in protecting potential
human life.' Anti-abortion advocates filed forty-six briefs; pro-
choice groups submitted thirty-two. The appellees' amicus briefs
represent[ed] 331 organizations and thousands of individu-
als, the collective scholarship of over 120 authors, [which]
produced a unique and convincing defense of Roe [v. Wade]
that fully explores the ramifications of removing a fundamen-
tal constitutional right from a generation of women who have
grown to depend on and exercise that right some 1.6 million
times each year. The organizing efforts of activists through-
out the country that were successful in convincing so many
organizations and individuals to participate in the case in
such a short period of time should be commended. 8 2
But other commentators opined that:
At least on the pro-life side, it appears that there was a delib-
erate strategy among pro-life groups to try to create the im-
pression, by filing as many briefs as possible, of widespread
and intense opposition to Roe v. Wade.... [I]t is hard to
imagine that thirty-two briefs were needed in order to lay out
all the considerations to a reaffirmation of Roe v. Wade. At
some level, the pro-choice forces appear also to have sought
to generate the impression of powerful interest group sup-
port for the outcome desired. The net effect was that the two
sides largely neutralized each other, at least in terms of trying
to demonstrate greater public support for their respective po-
178. Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, High Court Has 78 "Friends" in Abortion Case,
NAT'L LJ., Apr. 17, 1989, at 5 (quoting Professor Christine Kellet).
179. Cooper, supra note 174, at 684.
180. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 51, at 823.
181. See 492 U.S. 490, 519-20 (1989).
182. Kolbert, supra note 66, at 154-55.
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sitions.'8
3
Another means of potential distortion may occur injurisdic-
tions in which judges are elected, such as Texas. One commen-
tator expressed concern that "an interest group - albeit in an
amicus brief - may dangle its support in front of the judge by
communicating its concern regarding how the court will decide
a particular issue.""8 4
With rare exceptions,1 8 5 however, amici typically are op-
posed by other amici. Thus, countervailing viewpoints are ar-
gued to the court. This practice highlights the importance of
encouraging pro bono representation of not-for-profit groups, in-
digent litigants, and other under-served groups and persons to
ensure that their viewpoints receive attention and are not over-
shadowed by amici who have more resources but are offering
countervailing positions. Indeed, despite the criticism of the
amicus process as tantamount to sanctioned lobbying, its utility
has been recognized as a tool for protecting the underprivi-
leged; recall the commentator who characterized the amicus
party as the "vindicator of the politically powerless.' 8 6
C. Reciprocity of Submissions
In the event that non-U.S. courts are receptive to the sub-
mission of amicus briefs by U.S. citizens or U.S.-based parties,
there likely will be an expectation of reciprocity by tribunals in
the United States. Some U.S. courts already have accepted such
submissions; one example is the recent filing of amicus briefs in
Atkins v. Virginia,"8 7 in which the Supreme Court ruled that exe-
cuting mentally retarded defendants constituted cruel and unu-
sual punishment.18 8 In determining the Eighth Amendment vio-
lation, the Court specifically noted the "national consensus"
183. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 51, at 823.
184. Sorenson, supra note 38, at 1248.
185. One such exception isJaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), in which the Court
considered whether statements made by a police officer to her therapist during coun-
seling sessions after a fatal shooting were protected from compelled disclosure in a
federal civil action brought by the family of the deceased. Fourteen briefs were submit-
ted on behalf of the respondent, but none was submitted in support of the petitioner.
The Court affirmed the appellate decision and held that the communications with the
therapist were privileged under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. at 18.
186. See Lowman, supra note 9 at 1245.
187. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
188. See id.
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against such executions, citing an amicus brief submitted by the
European Union."8 9 The amicus had pointed out that "[w]ithin
the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for
crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelm-
ingly disapproved ... ."190 Schweitzer pointed out that the case
illustrates the utility of amicus submissions as a means of amplify-
ing a point that received more cursory attention in a litigant's
submission, noting that while the European Union's brief dis-
cussed the argument "at length, . . .Atkins' brief made th[e]
point in a mere sentence and footnote."191
When the U.S. Supreme Court considered affirmative ac-
tion issues in Grutter v. Bollinger, two concurring justices observed
that a race-conscious program having "'a logical end
point' . . . accords with the international understanding of the
office of affirmative action. 1 01 2 For example,
The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by the United States
in 1994, endorses special and concrete measures to ensure
the adequate development and protection of certain racial
groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purposes of
guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.1"3
Yet another example of such amicus filings was seen in con-
nection with the proceedings involving detentions at
GuantAmamo Bay, Cuba. In the consolidated cases of Rasul v.
Bush and Al Odah v. United Sttates,194 a bipartisan coalition of na-
tional and international NGOs filed an amicus brief in support of
the petitioners. 9 ' They argued collectively that the federal
189. Id. at 316 & n.21.
190. Id. at 316 n.21.
191. Schweitzer, supra note 55, at 536.
192. 539 U.S. 306, 342 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (Justice
Breyerjoined in the concurrence).
193. Id.
194. See Rasul v. Bush, 126 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
195. See Brief as Amicus Cuiae Bipartisan Coalition of Nat'l and Internat'l Non-
Governmental Organizations in Support of Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 126 S. Ct. 2686
(2004), Nos. 03-334, 03-343 (submitted Jan. 14, 2004). The coalition was comprised of
the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, the ACLU, the Anti-Defamation League, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Associa-
tion of Social Workers Legal Defense Fund, the People for the American Way Founda-
tion, the Rutherford Institute, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, the American Jewish
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courts have jurisdiction to hear the habeas claims of the petition-
ers, hundreds of people held by the United States at its military
base in Guant~mamo Bay.!96 The amici also offered multi-na-
tional legal perspectives about the confinements, arguing that
Israeli, British, and international law all required review of the
legality of the executive detentions."97
Another amicus brief was submitted by Abdullah A1-Joaid, a
Saudi Arabian citizen who is the brother of a Saudi national con-
fined at Guantimamo Bay. 198 Yet another amicus brief was filed
in support of the petitioners by 175 members of both Houses of
Parliament of the United Kingdom, 199 and still another brief was
filed by the Commonwealth Lawyers Association.2 °°
Developments in online and other forms of communication
and increased travel (including more opportunities for interna-
tional dialogue among judges) have contributed to the globaliza-
tion of consideration of legal process and the evolution of stat-
utes and jurisprudence. Accordingly,
cross-pollination and dialogue between jurisdictions is in-
creasingly occurring. As judgments in different countries in-
creasingly build on each other, mutual respect and dialogue
are fostered among appellate courts. Judges around the
world look to each other for persuasive authority, rather than
some judges being "givers" of law while others are "receiv-
ers."
2 0 1
U.S. courts may find it useful to accept amicus briefs from
non-U.S. nationals for the same reasons that filings by U.S. amici
Committee, Islamic Circle of North America, National Council of the Churches of
Christ in the U.S.A., and the Union for Reform Judaism. See id. at 1-5.
196. See id. at 8, 11.
197. See id. at 23.
198. See Brief as Amicus Curiae Abdullah Al Joaid in Support of Petitioners at 1,
Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), Nos. 03-334, 03-343 (submitted Jan. 14, 2004).
199. See Brief as Amicus Curiae of 175 Members of Both Houses of Parliament of
the United Kingdom, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), Nos. 03-334, 03-343 (sub-
mitted Jan. 14, 2004).
200. See Brief for the Commonwealth Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of the Petitioners, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004), Nos. 03-334, 03-343 (sub-
mittedJan. 14, 2004). Signatories to the brief are members of the English bar. See id. at
1.
201. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Ann Hirsch Lecture: Transnational Law as a Domestic
Resource: Thoughts on the Case of Women's Rights, 38 NEw ENG. L. Riv. 689, 693 (2004)
(quoting Claire L'Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the Inter-
national Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 17 (1998) (emphasis omitted)).
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help non-U.S. and multi-national courts. Such briefs enhance
the range of perspectives brought to the court, present diverse
cultural and empirical experiences, and provide substantive ex-
pertise on matters of non-U.S. law.
Consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court of matters of non-
U.S. law and norms has not been without its critics. In Lawrence
v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck down state criminal sodomy
laws.2 ° 2 The majority opinion took into account a case decided
by the European Court of Human Rights.2 °" ButJustice Antonin
Scalia lamented in dissent that
[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring ... into existence,
as the Court seems to believe, because [non-U.S. N]ations
decriminalize conduct. . . . The Court's discussion
of.. . [non-U.S.] views (ignoring, of course, the many coun-
tries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is
therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since
"this Court... should not impose [non-U.S.] moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans." 20 4
But Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted that while the Su-
preme Court generally has been reluctant "to look to interna-
tional or [non-U.S.] law in interpreting our own Constitution
and related statutes," the Court has "looked to international-law
notions of sovereignty when shaping our federalism jurispru-
dence and to international-law norms in boundary disputes be-
tween [U.S. S]tates. ' '20 5 She indicated that she anticipated in-
creasing attention to international legal standards in U.S. con-
texts; because issues of "international and [non-U.S.] law are
being raised in our courts more often and in more areas than
our courts have the knowledge and experiences to address," she
emphasized the importance of "expanded knowledge in this
field. '2 6 U.S. Supreme Court Justice O'Connor characterized
the relevance of conclusions reached by other Nations and the
international community as "transjudicialism. ''20  Such norma-
202. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
203. See id.
204. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
205. Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice O'Connor Predicts Greater Domestic Reliance on
Norms of International Law and Praises Institute's Increasing Transnational Focus, 24(4) A.L.I.
REPORTER, Summer 2002, available at http://www.ali.org/ali/R2404 4_Norms.htm (last
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tive principles, she noted, "should at times constitute persuasive
authority in [U.S.] court[s]," notwithstanding that such laws are
rarely binding on U.S. tribunals.2°8
One way consideration of non-U.S. law by the U.S. Supreme
Court has been accomplished is through the amicus device. In
the context of international human rights issues in particular, an
amicus brief was submitted by a group of international legal
scholars and human rights specialists in support of a federal civil
rights action pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act.2 09
The amicus emphasized the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which had been ratified by the United States,
and contended that the United States was obligated to provide
remedies for victims of gender-based violence. 210 Likewise, in
Nguyen v. INS, Equality Now submitted an amicus brief in connec-
tion with the constitutionality of a federal law that imposed dis-
parate requirements on U.S. male and female citizens who
sought to confer citizenship on children born outside the
United States. 2 1' As Professor Schneider observed, however,
"growing invocation of transnational sources by lawyers and con-
sideration by judges does not solve the vexing questions of how
these laws should be integrated into our complex system of fed-
eralism and what weight they should have, if considered. 212
D. Principles of Comity and Respect for Cultural Diversity
Decisions issued by non-U.S. courts that are repugnant to
the U.S. system of justice nevertheless may be legally counte-
nanced in the Nation in which they were issued. Conversely, ef-
forts to enforce certain decisions by non-U.S. tribunals in the
United States may be challenged on constitutional grounds.
One notable example is the resistance non-U.S. litigants have en-
countered in connection with efforts to enforce libel verdicts se-
cured in courts that do not have legal standards commensurate
with U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, in Matusevitch
v. Telnikoff the court granted summary judgment to a writer
208. Id.
209. See Brzonkala v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (cited by Schneider, supra
note 201, at 709).
210. See Schneider, supra note 201, at 709-10 & n.122.
211. See 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
212. Schneider, supra note 201, at 700.
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against whom a British court had issued a libel judgment.2t3 The
U.S. court determined that the plaintiff, a public figure, was re-
quired to obtain recognition of the judgment in order to en-
force it.214 But the court also determined that under the Uni-
form Foreign-Money Judgments Recognition Act of 1962,215 the
plaintiff could not do so because British libel standards were re-
pugnant to the public policies of the United States and the State
of Maryland. 6
In another case, however, Dow Jones & Company ("Dow
Jones"), a U.S. corporation, failed to secure a declaratory judg-
ment in a New York federal court that an article it had published
was not defamatory as a matter of U.S. law.2 y Specifically, Dow
Jones had argued that an action for defamation based on the
article would be summarily dismissed under the federal and
State constitutional law of any U.S. jurisdiction because the pub-
lication comprised only non-actionable expression of opinion
based on true statements and contained no facts capable of be-
ing proved false.2 1 ' However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the action
was non-justiciable because it was not ripe for adjudication.219
The court below declined to exercise jurisdiction to hear the
case under the Declaratory Judgment Act on the grounds that
no useful purpose would be served by a declaration and that it
213. See 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995); see also Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns,
Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
214. See Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995).
215. MD. CODE ANN., Cts. &Jud. Proc. § 10-704(b)(2) (2004).
216. See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 3-4.
217. See DowJones & Co., Inc. v. Harrods, Ltd., 346 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003) [here-
inafter Dow Jones I1].
218. See Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) [hereinafter Dow Jones I]. For example, Dow Jones asserted that under British
law: (1) the defendant bears the burden of proving the truth of defamatory statements;
(2) defamation is a strict liability tort and the plaintiff need not prove that the defen-
dant acted with fault, in contrast with the "actual malice" standard that applies to libel
claims asserted by public figures and public officials under American First Amendment
principles; (3) protection for expression of opinion is severely limited; (4) only limited
protection is available for statements about public officials or public figures; (5) aggra-
vated damages are permitted if certain defenses are asserted, such as when a defendant
seeks to justify the publication; (6) the plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs must be paid
by the unsuccessful defendant; and (7) multiple, repetitive suits are allowed for each
individual publication, for example, for different media or various places of publica-
tion. See id. at 403 n.18.
219. See DowJones II, 346 F.3d at 359-60.
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would contravene principles of international comity.12
Concerns about transgressing principles of comity or trepi-
dation about subverting or usurping. diplomatic and treaty-mak-
ing efforts through the amicus device in non-U.S. courts are
largely absent when the United States is a signatory to the appli-
cable treaty that established the court because jurisdictional and
standing issues effectively have been accommodated. In some
situations, as is the case, for example, with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, alleged victims must have ex-
hausted U.S. remedies at the national level as a prerequisite for
consideration of their petitions.2 2' As one of the Commission's
lawyers observed, "This requirement is crucial and underlines
the general principle of international law that the international
system plays a subsidiary role and is triggered by the failure of
national law to function properly."222 Therefore, the institu-
tional structure of the proceeding presupposes prior involve-
ment by participants in courts other than the adjudicating multi-
national tribunal to which the amicus briefs are submitted. The
offer of positional statements by U.S. parties is legitimized and
receptivity to non-U.S.-based amicus briefs likely will fare rela-
tively well in such multi-national courts.
When the matter is pending in a local court, a brief submit-
ted by a U.S. citizen or entity sometimes can still be very useful,
most notably by offering another perspective or detailing experi-
ence with the analysis of a similar or related issue. This role is
especially important as to a number of matters involving the
public interest. Even when the arguments advanced by amici are
not dispositive, they can be instructive.
The solicitude paid by the U.S. legal system to freedom of
speech, for instance, furthers a free press, helps deter and ex-
pose governmental corruption and other malfeasance, and per-
petuates robust and open dialogue about political, scientific, lit-
erary, artistic, and other matters of inherent importance to the
populace. Libel law has developed jurisprudentially, with a sig-
nificant constitutionally-rooted gloss, and thus provides a frame-
work for the resolution of competing interests in the free flow of
information and protection of reputation. An amicus brief sub-
220. See Dow Jones I, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 439, 443-46.
221. See Cerna, supra note 131, at 200.
222. Id.
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mitted by a member of a U.S. press entity to a non-U.S. court
adjudicating efforts to censor or impose sanctions on journalists
who reported about political issues could offer significant gui-
dance to the court. Current U.S. law on the public official/pub-
lic figure and private figure dichotomy, which was addressed
most prominently in cases that spanned a decade before the U.S.
Supreme Court, could be succinctly summarized to a non-U.S.
tribunal. 22' Legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress to address
efforts to hold Internet speech providers accountable for online
defamatory speech created by third parties, 224 and the ensuing
court decisions that applied the statute, 2 25 likewise could assist
non-U.S. judges as they grapple with the appropriate allocation
of liability.
Nevertheless, in some cultures and under certain circum-
stances, U.S.-based amici risk offending a court if they submit un-
solicited briefs grounded in U.S. policy or law and presenting
arguments as superior to locally-evolved precedent or norms. Al-
though amici in U.S. courts generally need not satisfy traditional
notions of standing otherwise imposed on the original litigants
or intervenors, such amici typically demonstrate some basis for
participating in the pending litigation that suggests an interest
in the outcome of the determination by the court. These inter-
ests attenuate when amici appear before a court that lacks juris-
diction to enforce a ruling against the amici who seek to opine
about the matter. It is especially important, therefore, that such
amici, while zealously advocating fundamental principles of jus-
tice, remain sensitive to the normative principles governing the
adjudicating tribunal.
E. Transparency of Interests
Critical to the fair administration of justice - as well as to
the nearly equally important objective of the appearance of the
fair administration of justice - is transparency of the nature of
interested parties. The U.S. Supreme Court has appropriately
223. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
224. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
225. See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. de-
nied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). Cf Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y.
1999) (considering similar issues without resorting to application of the Communica-
tions Decency Act), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1098 (2000).
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established requirements for disclosure about the nature and
sponsorship of the amici parties and the influence of the primary
litigant on the brief submitted.22 6 Although latent biases still
may exist, as when an industry trade group is anonymously
funded by a litigant, disclosure rules such as those implemented
by the Court deter support for a party that cannot be recognized
and taken into account by the tribunal.
Even when non-U.S. or multi-national court procedures do
not require such disclosures by amici, a practice of transparency
should be adopted. Those who represent important interests of
others can help legitimize their position by identifying the basis
on which they proceed in the court. In addition, disclosures by
amici enhance their credibility before the court, both by openly
identifying interests and potential biases and by negating any bi-
ases that a court might erroneously or presumptively infer.
F. The Proffer of Scientific and Other Technical Data That Dehors
the Record
The submission of empirically-based social science and
other data that dehors the record has been the subject of contro-
versy.227 The appellate process is designed to contain factual
matters that the higher court can review, focusing its attention
on factual evidence that has been adequately tested through the
adversarial process in the court(s) below. The presentation of
scientific or other technical studies by an amicus has been ques-
tioned as circumventing this process.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that even in a
Brandeis Brief, the amicus typically is not offering corroborative
or rebuttal evidence directly probative of the parties' dispute,
but rather is presenting social science or other information de-
signed to inform the court's decision generally. Thus, for exam-
ple, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court noted that
Appellants and various amici refer to medical data indicating
that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of
the first trimester, although not without its risk, is now rela-
tively safe. Mortality rates for women undergoing early abor-
tions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or
226. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 98-125 and accompanying text.
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lower than the rates for normal childbirth. 228
The amici's data was neither designed nor considered to test the
plaintiff's specific allegations that she "could not afford to travel
to another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under
safe conditions.
229
Moreover, it is clear that judges routinely take into account
extra-judicial matters when they formulate their opinions. This
is the case with respect to the development of various legal doc-
trines. By illustration, much of U.S. common law privacy juris-
prudence derives from a law review article written by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis published in 189020 and a taxon-
omy of causes of action fashioned by William Prosser.23' In
1977, the Restatement (Second) of Torts outlined the same cluster
of invasions of privacy rights. 232 All of these sources have been
relied on extensively by courts adjudicating privacy disputes.
Courts also may review factual data obtained in ways other
than Brandeis Briefs. In Mapp, the Supreme Court not only con-
sidered briefing and argument submitted by amicus ACLU,233
but the Court also took into account the remarks of Herbert
Hoover, then Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Although the federal courts had operated under the exclusion-
ary rule for almost a century before considering a similar issue in
Elkins v. United States,214 "'it ha[d] not been suggested either that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ha[d] thereby been ren-
dered ineffective, or that the administration of criminal justice
in the federal courts ha[d] thereby been disrupted.'" 23 5 In con-
sidering the empirical impact of its prior rulings and those of the
state courts, the Mapp Court noted that "[t]here is no war be-
tween the Constitution and common sense. 236
Indeed, judges often are influenced by a wide range of
scholarly and other writings, even when they do not necessarily
228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (footnote omitted).
229. Id. at 120.
230. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
231. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652.
233. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
234. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
235. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 & n.10 (1961) (citing Herbert Hoover, Di-
rector of the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
236. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.
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attribute the reasoning or phrasing to another. Among the most
well-known of Justice Harry Blackmun's pronouncements is his
endorsement of affirmative action in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke that " [i] n order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race. There is no other way." 23v The New York Times
reporter Linda Greenhouse spent several weeks reviewing Justice
Blackmun's collected papers in the Library of Congress and dis-
covered in his file on the Bakke case an article on affirmative
action. The article, which had been published in the November
1977 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, was marked by Justice Black-
mun as having been read on May 6, 1978, "in other words, as he
was preparing the opinion that was issued the next
month .... "2 The article's author, McGeorge Bundy, former
National Security Advisor and Dean of Harvard, had written:
"To get past racism, we must take account of race. There is no
other present way. "239 Justice Blackmun's opinion did not attri-
bute his apparent use of the quotation, however.
Factual information similarly comes to the Court's attention
independently of the parties' record on appeal. As of the writ-
ing of this Article, the Supreme Court has been considering the
question of whether U.S. President George W. Bush's adminis-
tration improperly declared Jos6 Padilla an "enemy combatant"
and wrongfully detained him. Weeks after briefing was com-
pleted and oral argument concluded in the case, the Depart-
ment of Justice declassified and released documents that report-
edly supported the government's position that Padilla had
"plot[ted] to detonate a radiological 'dirty bomb' or blow up an
apartment building .... "240 Although "the new material is not
expected to be entered into the record,"24 1 it might nonetheless
"have 'an inevitable spillover in unduly influencing the high
court just as it nears a decision in the case,'" noted counsel for
amicus the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 42
Access to press reports and even to the newly-released material
237. 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
238. Linda Greenhouse, Correspondence/The Blackmun Papers; At a Shrine of American
Documents, Pathos, Poetry and Blackmun's 'Rosebud,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, § 4, at 7.
239. Id. (quoting McGeorge Bundy, ATL. MONTHLY, Nov. 1977, available at http://
www.etsu.edu/cas/history/docs/bundy.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2004)).
240. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Spells Out Dangers Posed By Plot Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2004, at Al.
241. Id.
242. Id. (quoting Donald G. Rehkopf, Jr.).
134 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
itself might influence the Court - or fail to persuade it - in
ways neither Padilla nor the amici can contest or possibly even
know.
Is it conceivable that the U.S. Supreme Court is unmindful
of the abuses at the Abu Ghraib, Iraq prison that were reported
by the press as the Court deliberates about the legality of execu-
tive detentions at Guantdmamo Bay, Cuba in Rasul v. Bush and
Al Odah v. United States? Indeed, in an open letter to U.S. Presi-
dent George Bush, Britons Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal, who had
been held at GuantAmamo Bay, accused U.S. military guards of
subjecting them to abuses similar to those perpetrated in the
Abu Ghraib prison.24 3 In establishing standards for military de-
tention of prisoners in the pending case, it seems highly likely
that the justices will recall the vivid images reported in the press
of the abuses at Abu Ghraib.
Likewise, a memorandum prepared for U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld in March 2003 concluded that Presi-
dent Bush was not bound by either an international treaty that
proscribes torture or by federal anti-torture prohibitions.244
When the memorandum was made public in June 2004, The New
York Times noted that the lawyers who drafted the memorandum
contended that any torture committed at Guantdnamo Bay
would not violate the federal statute "because the base was under
[U.S.] legal jurisdiction and the statute concerns only torture
committed overseas. '245 The newspaper observed, "[t] hat view is
in direct conflict with the position the administration has taken
in the Supreme Court, where it has argued that prisoners at
Guantinamo Bay are not entitled to constitutional protections
because the base is outside [U.S.] jurisdiction."24 6 While public
attention to these issues is critical, it appears that the Court's
consideration of these issues may be grounded in sources other
than those submitted to the Court. Judges naturally bring their
experience and recollections to the matters they adjudicate and
it is not necessarily inappropriate for courts to be influenced by
extra-judicial matters simply because they are outside the record.
243. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg, et al., Guantdmamo Abuse Same As Abu Ghraib,
Say Britons, GUARDIAN, May 14, 2004, at 1.
244. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture Didn't
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The amicus process, though, has laudable procedural, ethical,
and disclosure requirements that sometimes may be lacking in
certain press reports and other sources.
Amicus filings offer a mechanism to influence the court in a
fashion open to scrutiny by the primary litigants and the public
at large. Judges are positioned to premise their decisions on em-
pirically-founded or statistically significant data, rather than hav-
ing to resort to potentially distorted personal impression or
mere recollection. Sources of persuasion are thereby better
known to the public and to those interested in the outcome of
the proceeding and are subject to challenge or endorsement.
Amicus briefs are submitted through a prism of procedural re-
quirements that demand (or should demand) revelation of mat-
ters pertaining to possible biases, such as sources of funding for
the briefs. Participation by amici who support the public interest
is especially critical to ensuring that such viewpoints receive ade-
quate attention. Furthermore, the amicus device in such circum-
stances offers a critical means by which positions that disserve
the under-represented public can be viably contested.
When such participation takes the form of a Brandeis Brief,
disclosure requirements should be more extensive. The amicus
litigant should be expected to explain the methodology utilized
to obtain the proffered data and disclose whether the findings
put forth are statistically significant. Directly conflicting studies
known to the amicus should be identified, just as an amicus party
would be expected to disclose in connection with a legal argu-
ment that the decision upon which he relies has been reversed
by an appellate court. Moreover, disclosure requirements per-
taining to funding should extend beyond the specification of
persons or entities who financially supported the submission of
the brief and identify as well those who sponsored the underly-
ing research. Such transparency would help enable assessment
by opposing litigants, including opposing amici and the judicial
arbiter, of the credibility, reliability, and relevance of the data
proffered.
Pro bono support of public interest amici seeking Brandeis
Brief-type participation is especially important to the fair admin-
istration of justice. Unlike an amicus filing premised exclusively
on matters of legal interpretation, a Brandeis Brief may necessi-
tate research investigation. Securing factual support for a posi-
tion often may be more costly and more cumbersome than un-
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dertaking legal research, thereby requiring a greater commit-
ment of financial and other resources.
The amicus device allows a legitimate and appropriate way
for persons or groups with a lower threshold level of interest to
meaningfully participate in the litigants' dialogue with the court.
In contrast to legislative endeavors, direct lobbying efforts or
other direct communications with judges in order to influence
the outcome of litigation typically are not available options. Ami-
cus briefs can be submitted by diverse factions in a controversy in
order to cogently express viewpoints in connection with the
court's deliberations about a case.
VII. A MODEL FOR PRO BONO AMICUS PARTICIPATION IN
NON-U.S. AND MULTI-NATIONAL TRIBUNALS
The submission of amicus curiae briefs should be en-
couraged by non-U.S., multi-national, and U.S. courts. The pri-
mary reason that courts should be receptive to such filings is that
they can help advance the judiciary's ultimate objective of issu-
ing principled, reasoned decisions that are premised on ade-
quate consideration of competing interests. Additional briefing
helps ensure that more perspectives are considered, thatjudicial
pronouncements do not have unintended consequences, and
that court rulings fairly contemplate (or pointedly exempt) ap-
plication to persons or groups who should not be covered by the
decisions.
U.S. parties may perhaps be in a position to offer a perspec-
tive from experience, perhaps because U.S. jurisprudence may
have considered the issue or because a public interest group or
other organization may have deliverated about the underlying
policies or conducted relevant empirical research. Courts, in-
cluding non-U.S. and multi-national tribunals, regularly grapple
with the fashioning of legal precepts that have expansive, and
thus predictive, application. Justice Harlan admonished that "it
is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and
reflect[; thus] we should not, as judges, merely recite the expec-
tations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling
them upon society. ' 24 7 Nearly a century ago, the U.S. Supreme
Court commented, "Legislation, both statutory and constitu-
247. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 28:88
2004] THE UTILITY OF PRO BONO REPRESENTATION 137
tional, is enacted ... from an experience of evils .... [But] its
general language should not ... be necessarily confined to the
form that evil had theretofore taken .... [A] principle to be vital
must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth. 24
8
By adding to the scope and diversity of perspectives to
which the court has access, amici assist the judiciary as it works to
fashion more durable pronouncements because amici can sensi-
tize judges to the interstitial application of nuanced phrasing of
rulings that might otherwise escape notice. Robust speech, even
when conflicting and cacophonous, enhances the "marketplace
of ideas"24 9 from which the court can divine and craft principled
analysis.
It should not be surprising that the highest volume of ami-
cus filings are in cases involving profound matters of privacy and
social policy, such as those considering end-of-life issues. 25 ° A
non-U.S. court that is called upon to adjudicate such issues with-
out the benefit of amicus submissions presumably faces a more
daunting task. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated when it
considered an issue of "transcendent importance, involving
questions relating to the definition and existence of death, 251
when such issues do arise, "[l]aw, equity and justice must not
themselves quail and be helpless in the face of modern techno-
logical marvels presenting questions hitherto unthought of." ' 2 5 2
Diverse sources of perspective and experience help courts fash-
ion decisions in a deliberative and well-founded manner.
These considerations are particularly important in the con-
text of matters that affect the public interest and in cases that
adjudicate the rights of under-represented persons or groups
that otherwise might have their concerns or advocacy overshad-
owed by opposing litigants with better resources. Absent submis-
sions by amici in support of their positions, courts might lose
sight of arguments favoring underprivileged litigants or be inad-
equately directed to focus on competing considerations that af-
248. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
249. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting).
250. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
251. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 652 (NJ. 1976), cert. denied sub nor. Garger v.
NewJersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
252. Id. at 665.
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fect them. In non-U.S. locales where public interest organiza-
tions have not been established or have not matured to the point
of adequately serving these interests, the need for pro bono assis-
tance by U.S. and other amici is even more acute.
Nevertheless, unfettered entitlement to file amicus briefs in
the absence of procedural and other safeguards risks manipula-
tion of the process to the detriment of the very litigants most
deserving of protection and support. Accordingly, while amicus
filings should be encouraged, both the approach and the requi-
site procedural requirements should be considered.
When participation by U.S. litigants is contemplated in
multi-national tribunals, as when the United States is a signatory
to a treaty conferring jurisdiction on U.S. citizens, concerns
about participation by U.S.-based amici dissipate. In other cir-
cumstances, however, the U.S. amicus may want to participate in
the process while evincing respect for the jurisdiction's law and
culture.
One meaningful way that civil rights and other social justice
causes can be furthered is through pro bono representation not
just of litigants but also of amici. A useful model for advancing
the interests of under-served persons and organizations in non-
U.S. and multi-national courts can be found in an amicus brief
that offers the U.S. view contextualized within an international
perspective. This method may be especially valuable when the
amicus is not aligned, in whole or in part, with either party.
This approach also comports with U.S. legal paradigms
about the proffer of expert testimony to assist the court on mat-
ters relating to non-U.S. law. The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure specifically contemplate the admissibility of such expert tes-
timony.253 Indeed, in determining a matter of non-U.S. law, a
U.S. court may consider "any relevant material or
source . . .whether or not submitted by a party or admissible
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. '254 A federal court may
apply non-U.S. law in this situation even when neither party so
requests.255
A brief that explains U.S. jurisprudence and the policies un-
253. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
[Vol. 28:88
2004] THE UTILITY OF PRO BONO REPRESENTATION 139
derlying due process rights for criminal defendants, for exam-
ple, might well assist a non-U.S. or multi-national court assess the
inherent fairness of the manner in which a defendant has been
prosecuted. By offering an established analytical framework for
the adjudication of the charges, the amicus may successfully fur-
nish principles for adoption - albeit even with some modifica-
tion - by the non-U.S. tribunal.
One notable recent illustration of this approach can be
found in the case of Mauricio Herrera Ulloa and Ferndn Vargas
Rohrmoser of "La Naci6n" Newspaper v. The Republic of Costa Rica256
("La Nacin case"). There the Open Society Justice Initiative
submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the application by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to order
Costa Rica to revoke the criminal defamation conviction of Mau-
ricio Herrera Ulloa "and bring its criminal libel and insult laws
in line with international standards. 257
The Open Society Justice Initiative amicus brief pointed out
the requirements of Article Thirteen of the American Conven-
tion and the standards of the European Court of Human Rights,
as well as relevant legal principles of Argentina, Australia, Ger-
many, India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines,
South Africa, and the United Kingdom.258
The Committee to Protect Journalists ("CPJ") also submit-
ted an amicus curiae brief to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in support of the Costa Rican journalist, likewise ob-
jecting to his conviction of criminal defamation.259 Joining CPJ
in the amicus effort were The Associated Press, Cable News Net-
256. Case No. 12.367, [2001] Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 128/01.
257. Brief as Amicus Curiae of Open Society Justice Initiative in Support of the In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights' Application at 1 [hereinafter Justice Initi-
ative Brief], Mauricio Herrera Ulloa and Fernn Vargas Rohrmoser of "La Nacitn"
Newspaper v. The Republic of Costa Rica, Case No. 12.367 (Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, submitted May 2004).
258. See id. at 7-30.
259. See Brief as Amici Curiae of the Associated Press, Cable News Network LP,
LLLP, El Comercio, Committee to Protect Journalists, the Hearst Corporation, the
Miami Herald Publishing Company, El Neuvo Dia, La Prensa, the Reforma Group,
Reuters Ltd, El Tiempo and Tribune Company in Support of Mauricio Herrera Ulloa
and Fernan Vargas Rohromoser, Mauricio Herrera Ulloa and Ferndn Vargas Rohr-
moser of "La Nacidn" Newspaper v. The Republic of Costa Rica, Case No. 12.367 (Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, submitted Feb. 18, 2004), available at http://www.
cpj.org/news/2004/Costal9febO4_AmicusBrief.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2004) [herein-
after CPJ Brief].
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work LP, LLLP, El Comercio, El Nuevo Dia, El Tiempo, The Hearst
Corporation, La Prensa, The Miami Herald Publishing Company,
The Reforma Group, Reuters Ltd, and the Tribune Company. 26 °
These amici, represented on a pro bono basis by Debevoise &
Plimpton LLP,26' argued that Costa Rica's criminal conviction of
the journalist violated international standards of defamation
law.
26 2
This approach also comports with Judge Posner's elucida-
tion of one of the key purposes that an amicus serves when the
amicus has "unique information or perspective that can help the
court beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are able to
provide." 263 The amicus briefs filed by the Open Society Justice
Initiative and CPJ broadened the perspectives put before the In-
ter-American Court of Human Rights and enabled it to consider
how liability for criminal libel is analyzed by several other legal
systems. In July 2004, the court ordered Costa Rica to annul the
conviction of the reporter, "emphasiz[ing] that public officials
and public figures must be more open to criticism than private
individuals . . . and [holding] that the Costa Rican trial court
had wrongly forced the reporter to prove the truth of statements
that originally appeared in another publication. '264 Amici coun-
sel characterized the former point as "a tenet that many Latin
American legal systems have been slow to recognize, 26' a point
260. See id.
261. See Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Departments, Pro Bono, available at http://
www.debevoise.com/practices/group.asp?groupid=6 (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) (describ-
ing its pro bono work "[c]ounseling and litigating for the Committee to ProtectJournal-
ists in support of its efforts to combat violations of press freedom worldwide," and not-
ing that the firm "filed amicus briefs for CPJ in the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the courts of Croatia
and Taiwan to challenge criminal libel prosecutions of journalists ... .
262. See CPJ Brief, supra note 259, at 20-40.
263. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted).
264. Erik Bierbauer & Pablo Valverde, Inter-American Court Rules for Defendants in
Two Criminal Defamation Cases: A Step Forward for the Press in Latin America, MLRC MEDI-
AIAwLETrER, Oct. 2004, at 41. The ruling effectively voided the sentence that had been
imposed against the reporter in 1999 on the ground that the state "violated the right to
freedom of thinking and expression, in the terms of Article 13 of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights." Costa Rica: Court Overturns Costa Rican Defamation Sentence; CPJ
Welcomes Decision, 2004 NEws ALERT (Comm. to ProtectJournalists), Aug. 4, 2004, availa-
ble at http://www.cpj.org/news/2004/Costa04aug04na.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004)
(quoting court decision). The court also ordered Costa Rica to pay Herrera Ulloa
U.S.$20,000 in damages and U.S.$10,000 for legal fees. See id.
265. Bierbauer & Valverde, supra note 264, at 41.
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the amici helped highlight for the court. The amici's lawyers fur-
ther noted that "[u]ntil the last several years, it was widely ac-
cepted in Latin America that government officials received
greater protection from criticism by the press than private individ-
uals." 2 66
Even when U.S. amici are not participating in a multi-na-
tional court established by a treaty with jurisdiction over the
amici, participation by amici curiae in human rights and other
public interest contexts can help further intrinsic principles of
justice. As well, the presentation by the amici of an array of
multi-national legal approaches also serves to dilute a potential
negative perspective that a U.S.-based organization presump-
tuously seeks to have a court adopt the laws or jurisprudence of
the United States. Furthermore, the argument that numerous
other nations' laws already have recognized the position ad-
vanced by the amici buttresses their position, as was the case
when the Open Society Justice Initiative contextualized its argu-
ment within an international consensus on the issue.
U.S.-based amici can serve a valuable function even when
they premise arguments exclusively on federal or state law. They
can explain the historical experience of U.S. jurisprudence, per-
haps by expounding on rationales that have been discredited by
courts in favor of principles that evolved through examination of
the empirical impact of earlier rulings. Concerns about the
presumptuousness of appearances by U.S. amici may attenuate in
connection with the submission by U.S. amici of Brandeis Briefs.
In such cases, there may be a greater tendency by a tribunal to
recognize that factual support for the position advanced may not
be available from other sources because investigation and re-
search had not been undertaken elsewhere. A countervailing
consideration is that certain factual investigation, such as that
involving social science research, may encompass cultural norms
unique to U.S. society. U.S. amici may offer perspectives while
remaining sensitive to disparate cultural practices and exper-
iences.
This approach is somewhat analogous to the U.S. federal
system, which precludes the admission of expert testimony on
matters of U.S. law.267 When non-U.S. law is at issue, however, a
266. Id. at 42-43 (emphasis in original).
267. See FED. R. EVD. 702; see also Nieves-Villaneuva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 99
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federal court may admit testimony from an expert as to the law
of another country. 26 8 Thus, the U.S. paradigm accommodates
the solicitation of testimony by experts on matters of non-U.S.
law, even as it recognizes the U.S. judge as the paramount deter-
minant of U.S. law issues. Because U.S. amici are not proffering
expert testimony on matters of another nation's sovereign law,
they are not presumptively foreclosed from arguing how another
country's law should be interpreted or applied. But when the
U.S. amici participate to elucidate U.S. legal principles (which
are a matter of non-U.S. law to the adjudicating tribunal), the
amici's perspectives on the U.S. experience may well constitute
the "unique information or perspective" envisaged by Judge Pos-
ner.
269
Procedural requirements should be imposed on amici, even
if such requirements effectively are self-imposed absent explicit
court rules. Thus, amici should disclose the nature of the amici
parties, any meaningful authorship by a party to the litigation,
and the sources of funding for the amicus submission, including
the sponsorship of any empirical research. 27 ° Such disclosures
should presumptively apply as well, for example, when a primary
litigant party receives extensive funding for his filing from an-
other, including from a U.S.-based entity. The Open Society Jus-
tice Initiative expressly noted in its amicus brief submitted in the
La Naci6n case that it is an organization that
pursues law reform activities grounded in the protection of
human rights, and contributes to the development of legal
capacity for open societies. The Justice Initiative combines
litigation, legal advocacy, technical assistance, and the dissem-
ination of knowledge to secure advances in five priority areas:
national criminal justice, international justice, freedom of in-
formation and expression, equality and citizenship, and an-
ticorruption. Its offices are in Abuja, Budapest, and New
York.27'
The Open Justice Initiative also informed the court, both by so
(1st Cir. 1997) (stating, "It is black-letter law that 'it is not for witnesses to instruct the
jury as to applicable principles of law, but for the judge.'") (citations omitted).
268. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
269. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir.
1997).
270. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
271. Justice Initiative Brief, supra note 257, at 2. Indeed, the amicus' Statement of
Interest comprised more than another page of its brief. See id.
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noting on its brief and by so stating in a cover letter, that it was
assisted in the preparation of the brief by the New York-based
law firm Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, which acted as of
counsel on a pro bono basis. 272
Another important disclosure concerns explanation of the
methodology utilized by amici proffering scientific or other tech-
nical data, such as in the form of a Brandeis Brief. In addition,
sources of the funding for the research should be disclosed.
Such transparency measures enable the court to more accurately
scrutinize possible biases and interests not otherwise readily ap-
parent from the mere identity of the amicus.
CONCLUSIONS
Non-U.S. and multi-national courts should be receptive to
participation by non-U.S. amici. Such participants should re-
spect principles of comity and normative cultural diversity while
working to advocate principles of fundamental fairness in the
adjudicatory process and the application of inherent principles
of justice. Tension between these objectives may exist, but it be-
hooves amici appearing in non-U.S. and multi-national courts to
prioritize efforts to promote justice and the public interest over
an attempt to harmonize international law merely for the sake of
consistency with U.S. statutes and jurisprudence.
The partisan nature of many amici briefs is neutralized by
requirements of disclosure as to interest, authorship, and
sources of funding, and is legitimized by counter-point party and
amici submissions and by the role of judges and clerks as impar-
tial arbiters. But partisanship is important in the context of ad-
vocating on behalf of public interest causes, both as a means of
urging justice for underprivileged factions and in order to rebut
opposing positions.
Pro bono representation of public interest amici is especially
important in light of the increasingly common practice of filing
amicus briefs, support for which typically is easier to marshal by
the government and the private sector. 'As Judge Posner ob-
272. See id.; see also Letter from James A. Goldston, Executive Director of Open
Society Justice Initiative, to Pablo Saavedra Alessandri, Secretary of Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (May 6, 2004); Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Practice, Pro
Bono, available at http://www.simpsonthacher.com/practice.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2004).
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served, one of the most important purposes served by amicus fil-
ings is to assist a party who is not represented competently or is
not represented at all.2 7 3 Even when the primary litigants are
well represented, the not-for-profit sector can highlight the ef-
fects of the law's application on underprivileged parties, supple-
ment the parties' arguments, and rebut assertions by parties and
other amici that support positions antithetical to the public inter-
est. Lawyers who undertake on a pro bono basis to represent amici
to advance the causes of such parties provide a critical service in
the fair administration of justice.
Issues amici raise can be considered by the court before it
renders its ruling, in effect offering an opportunity to save the
tribunal from erroneously interpreting a law, failing to take into
account unintended effects of its ruling, omitting consideration
of important factual information, or inadvertently ignoring
other pending cases or exigent relevant circumstances. Amici
can help facilitate the rational development of the law, enhance
access by courts to diverse viewpoints, and exploit a legitimate,
productive, and visible means of insurgency against injustice.
Pro bono representation of public interest amici offers an oppor-
tunity to participate as a significant catalyst for the preservation
and advancement of justice. Accordingly, notwithstanding the
inevitable self-interest of the amici in furthering their causes, the
amici are, as the lexicon suggests, "friends of the court." And
amici who participate to advance important causes of the public
interest are, as well, friends of justice.
273. See Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063 (citations omitted).
